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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON THE COSTS OF INDUCING INNOVATION
Kyle R. Myers
Matthew Grennan
This dissertation explores the costs and benefits of inducing innovation at the level of markets, individuals and knowledge. First, I examine the extent to which the National Institutes
of Health can direct its resources and generate production in specific areas of science. I find
that it can, and that science funded through these directed efforts is significantly more productive than average. Second, I identify how willing individual scientists are to adjust the
trajectories of their research in exchange for additional resources - the elasticity of direction.
Estimated magnitudes suggest that the directional adjustment costs of biomedical science
are large enough to warrant policy attention. Finally, in joint work with Mark Pauly, we
explore the growing costs of R&D in the pharmaceutical industry in order to identify how
much might be efficient cost growth in response to a larger market. Almost all of the growth
in R&D spending can be attributed to demand, with no evidence that marginal investments
have become less productive over the past thirty years.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iv

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

v

LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CHAPTER 1 :

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CHAPTER 2 :

Managing the Rate and Direction of Public Science: Evidence from

ix
1

the NIH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

2.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

2.2

Managing Research at the NIH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

2.3

Theoretical Motivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

2.4

Aggregate Analysis: Rate of Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

2.5

Productivity: Science and Scientist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

2.6

Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

CHAPTER 3 :

The Elasticity of the Direction of Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

3.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

3.2

Setting and Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

3.3

Identification via Compensating Differentials

3.4

Identification via Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

3.5

Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

CHAPTER 4 :

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

A Ricardian-Demand Explanation for Changing Pharmaceutical R&D
Productivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

vi

4.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

4.2

Theoretical Motivation: David Ricardo and Productive Ideas . . . . . . . . . 89

4.3

Empirical Production Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

4.4

Data Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

4.5

Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

4.6

Conclusion

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

vii

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1 :

Summary Statistics of RFAs by Grant Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

TABLE 2 :

Inducement Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

TABLE 3 :

Summary Statistics of Subject-Level Rate of Science Outcomes . . . 37

TABLE 4 :

Heterogenous Effects Across Scientists and Subjects . . . . . . . . . . 43

TABLE 5 :

Substitution or Spillovers Across Grant Types and Peer Subjects . . 46

TABLE 6 :

Productivity of Awarded Applications: Endogenous vs. RFA-Induced 48

TABLE 7 :

Simulated Threshold Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

TABLE 8 :

IV Results: Project-Level Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

TABLE 9 :

RFA-Open Levels Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

TABLE 10 : Compensating Differentials per Redirections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
TABLE 11 : Compensating Differentials for Scientist Subsets . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
TABLE 12 : Entry Determinants and Elasticities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
TABLE 13 : Entry Determinants and Elasticities, by Scientist Experience . . . . . 83
TABLE 14 : Drug Category Crosswalk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
TABLE 15 : NME Production Per Private R&D and NIH Science, 1985-2000 . . . 103
TABLE 16 : Private R&D Investments per NIH and Potential Demand, 1985-2000 106
TABLE 17 : NME Production with Endogenous Investments, 1985-2013 . . . . . . 108

viii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1 :

Trends in Solicitation at the NIH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

FIGURE 2 :

RFA-Open Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

FIGURE 3 :

MeSH Structure and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

FIGURE 4 :

Out-of-Sample Variation Explained by Subject Fixed Effects . . . . 23

FIGURE 5 :

Two-Stage Markets of Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

FIGURE 6 :

Raw Difference-in-Difference of Rates of Science . . . . . . . . . . . 38

FIGURE 7 :

RFA Treatment Effects, Application Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

FIGURE 8 :

RFA Treatment Effects, Subsequent Publications from Basic Science Awards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

FIGURE 9 :

RFA Treatment Effects, Role of Political Capital . . . . . . . . . . . 42

FIGURE 10 : Substitution or Spillovers from Investigator-Initiated Contest . . . . 45
FIGURE 11 : Win Probability Discontinuities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
FIGURE 12 : Distribution of Application Grades

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

FIGURE 13 : Scientific Similarity Distributions: Open vs. RFA . . . . . . . . . . 70
FIGURE 14 : Entry per Scientific Similarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
FIGURE 15 : Private NME R&D Investments: Actual and Predicted . . . . . . . 88
FIGURE 16 : Illustrative Count of Drug Candidates and the Role of Demand and
Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
FIGURE 17 : Identifying Production Shocks amidst Demand Growth . . . . . . . 93
FIGURE 18 : Trends in NME output per Potential Demand and NIH Basic Science, 1987-2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
FIGURE 19 : Trends in Revenues per Drugs and R&D Expenditures, 1985-2012 . 111

ix

CHAPTER 1 : Introduction
The economic and social determinants of the rate and direction of innovation have long
been of interest to scholars. These factors are relevant to many aspects of the economy
from the management of specialists in laboratories and organizations, to national policies
on the subsidizing and regulation of R&D. Initial work by Kenneth Arrow, Richard Nelson
and Sidney Winter identified many of the major tensions in this field, but recent advents in
data accessibility and the ability to quantify traditionally imprecise concepts, such as the
“direction” of innovation, provide a unique opportunity to revisit and address these questions
with robust empirical techniques.
This dissertation investigates how specialized individuals and firms respond to changes in
the demand for particular types of innovations, emphasizing the magnitude of frictions that
can constrain the extent to which a manager or market may be able to “induce” innovation.
To begin, Chapter 2 investigates the use of targeted research competitions at the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). The rationale for the public funding of basic science is well understood - firms will underinvest in certain types of science because of limited appropriability
(Nelson 1959; Arrow 1962). However, the ability of the public agencies to direct, and not
just provide, funds for specific types of science has not received much scrutiny. This chapter provides causal evidence on the ability of targeted contests at the NIH to achieve this
direction. An algorithm is used to classify the biomedical subjects of abstracts and measure
the rate of science in each possible direction. This facilitates a straightforward differencein-difference design at the level of these scientific subjects to identify changes in the rates
of science targeted by the NIH, while accounting for the potential role of political capital. I
find an increase in the rate of targeted science proposed and funded at the NIH on the order
of 10%. Instrumental variable estimates indicate large productivity gains - projects funded
through targeted requests generate almost twice as many publications per dollar.
Given evidence that new science is induced, Chapter 3 identifies a key parameter under-
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lying the responsiveness of scientists to these targeted interventions: the elasticity of the
redirection of research, ε. Using a novel dataset of targeted grant contests at the NIH and a
validated measure of scientific similarity, I identify the parameter using two approaches: first
as a compensating differential, and second as a fixed cost of entry. Conditional on applying
to the NIH, scientists are indifferent between a 1 s.d. redirection (moving to less similar
science) and an additional $1.6 million in expected grant value. Per the entry model, being
10% closer to a contest, in the scientific sense, increases entry probability the same as an
$1.2 million (48%) increase in the grant funds available for competition. These magnitudes
(ε ≈ 0.25 − 0.6) suggest that the directional adjustment costs of biomedical science are large
enough to warrant policy attention.
Looking at the determinants of innovation at a more aggregated level and within a private market of firms, Chapter 4 with Mark Pauly investigates the dramatic growth in the
pharmaceutical R&D costs per new drug. We draw insight from David Ricardo’s theory of
demand-driven productivity in settings of variable scarce resources - here, valuable new drug
ideas - and estimate the industry’s responsiveness to changes in demand over the past three
decades. In contrast to many critics of this industry, our results suggest that innovative
new drugs have been brought to market remarkable consistency since the late-1980s, and
rather than any major supply-side frictions, it appears that increased competition in drug
development have effectively bid down excessive profits from decades past.

2

CHAPTER 2 : Managing the Rate and Direction of Public Science: Evidence from
the NIH
2.1. Introduction
Since the arguments of Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962), it has been held that the private
sector will underinvest in the socially optimal amount of basic science - knowledge generation
- given the inability to appropriate its full value. In order to address this friction, the
government must not only provide funds, but they must also direct these funds to the
specific activities underinvested in by the private sector. Typically, public organizations
rely on peer-review panels to assess the value of funding opportunities. There is growing
evidence from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) that such panels are able to identify
promising lines of research (Li and Agha 2015) and draw on expertise without losses due
to strategic incentives (Li 2017). However, it is still not clear a priori that the allocation of
funds decided by scientists themselves will be optimal from society’s perspective (Dasgupta
and David 1994)1 . So while related work has identified the productivity of publicly funded
basic research in general (Jacob and Lefgren 2011; Azoulay et al. 2015c), this Chapter is an
important complement as it examines the ability of the NIH, the largest public funder of
science, to choose where in the spectrum of science production occurs.
While the NIH traditionally solicits any proposal for research that may “enhance health,
lengthen life, and reduce illness and disability,” roughly 25% of the annual budget (∼$8.2
billion in 2016) is allocated to requests for applications (RFAs) that focus on specific scientific
subjects. The goal of this Chapter is identifying to what extent these allocations can induce
new science that would not have otherwise occurred - an effect necessary to address the
issues raised by Nelson and Arrow, but one lacking causal evidence as to its magnitude.
1

To quote the authors, “This sort of non-congruence between private and social rankings of final outcomes
creates fundamental grounds for suspecting that the research portfolio that would be, in effect, selected, for
society by the self-governing community of scientists will be an inefficient one” (Dasgupta and David 1994,
pp. 506). This incongruence stems from the fact that a prize-centric reward system - which is necessary in
science given the inappropriability of information - will inherently cause directional distortions (Bryan and
Lemus 2016)
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Essentially, the NIH’s objective is to generate a demand shock large enough to induce a corresponding supply increase. What might limit the NIH’s ability to do so? First, since science
is funded through a multitude of public and private sources, other funders may anticipate
growth in particular funding streams at the NIH and reduce their own allocations. Such
crowd-out is possible due to the limited appropriability of knowledge. Second, given the
quasi-fixed supply of this specialized workforce (e.g. Goolsbee 1998) and the control relinquished to scientists during production (e.g. Aghion et al. 2008), it is unclear that a demand
shock can be generated that is large enough to increase the supply of a particular type of
science. Conversely, incentivizing new research pursuits may alleviate certain frictions that
constrain scientists in their evaluation of new ideas (e.g. Boudreau et al. 2016a).
To investigate the aggregate effect of these forces, I utilize the NIH’s administrative database
to construct a novel dataset of roughly 900 RFAs, 8 years of grant applications from more
than 80,000 scientists, along with all of the scientists’ publications, regardless of funding
source. This dataset facilitates two complementary analyses: (1) a difference-in-difference
design at the level of scientific subjects (i.e. “neoplasms”, “hormones”) to test whether new
science can be induced by RFAs, and (2) instrumental variable regressions to disentangle
the extent to which productivity effects are driven by within-project differences (i.e. more
science per publication) or across-project differences (i.e. more publications per project).
The data and algorithm help me tackle a major difficulty facing empirical work on the rate
and direction of innovation: categorizing and indexing technologies. The state-of-the-art text
algorithm from the National Library of Medicine enables me to extract information from
abstracts of grant applications, publications, and RFAs. The algorithm identifies the unique
set of biomedical subjects relevant to a body of text, and is based on a standardized and
highly detailed dictionary providing clear boundaries and relationships between subjects.
Measurement issues aside, estimating the causal effects of these interventions from observational data requires that the NIH’s decision to create each RFA is exogenous to factors
that would otherwise influence scientists’ preferences over the targeted science. However,
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the NIH is a political institution who’s own demand - which is influenced by Congress - is
likely correlated with other forces of supply and demand in the market of science.
Consider the case of the recent Zika Virus outbreak. This event was followed by both
Congressional requests for research on the topic as well as an RFA the same year2 . Presumably, the outbreak also increased the inherent value of Zika virus research to scientists
- individuals responsible for any breakthroughs would likely gain notoriety that would not
have occurred in the absence of the outbreak3 . Thus, estimating scientists’ responsiveness
in this scenario would confound both the NIH’s targeted allocation with other, non-NIH
demand-side changes, potentially overestimating the ability of the NIH to redirect research.
In order to account for these correlated demand- or supply-side events (e.g. new discoveries)
I construct a proxy for the political capital of each subject - its appearance in Congressional
appropriation bills - in order to separately identify effects for the science that is “caught
up” in these contests, given that when creating these contests NIH staff must target a range
of subjects. For example, in the case of the RFA requesting research on Zika, the research
objectives also welcomed projects on “Lyme borreliosis” and “Mycobacterium tuberculosis”
and I focus on these latter subjects.
Overall, my results indicate that with an average size of $11 million and 6-7 grants, the
targeted contests induce a 8% (12%) increase in the rate of science proposed in all (successful)
applications. The evidence also suggests that the newly proposed science is of roughly
comparable ex-ante quality (per success rates) to counterfactual science, while being nearly
twice as marginally productive in ex-post terms of publication mentions per application
mention. These productivity gains at the level of science appear to be almost entirely due to
differences across projects - compared to the traditional “investigator-initiated” mechanism,
projects awarded via RFAs generate 1.8 times as many publications per dollar awarded.
2
Requests for research specifically on Zika virus appear in the 2016 appropriation bills for the Department
of Health and Human services, as well as in a 2016 targeted research contest at the NIH, see RFA-AI-16-034.
3
In fact, they already have; see: S. Mukherjee, “The Race for a Zika Vaccine”, The New Yorker, August
22, 2016.
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These gains combined with a lack of any apparent substitution away from non-treated subject areas suggests that, so long as the marginal value of knowledge in the treated subjects
is at least half as large as in the non-treated subjects, these RFAs are a cost-effective use of
public resources committed to basic science. However, RFAs intended for small businesses
do not exhibit the clear signs of inducement observed in the basic science grants. Thus,
while these early-stage commercial grants have been seen to alleviate frictions unique to
emerging firms (Howell 2015), these results highlight the difficulties that policymakers may
face when redirecting scientists at this stage of development.
This Chapter is most closely related to the literature on public “inducement prizes”. Williams
(2012) provides an overview of the state of science regarding inducement prizes citing the
major difficulties facing empirical work on these mechanisms, namely, identifying a valid
counterfactual, which I am able to address with my data. Brunt et al.’s (2012) analyses of
prizes awarded by the Royal Agricultural Society of England during the turn of the 20th century is closely related to my paper. They find that prizes awarded for new, patentable technologies were effective and that efforts did not appear to substitute away from non-targeted
technologies. They argue, as I do here, that the timing of the governments’ intervention was
plausibly exogenous to underlying trends in the supply or demand for these technologies
that might have unobservably increased the benefits (or decreased the costs) of invention.
Unlike this prior study, my data allows me to statistically test this assumption.
An earlier examination of the NIH by Hegde and Sampat (2015) focused on the private
sector’s ability to influence the NIH’s allocations. Their result - that lobbying efforts can
increase NIH award rates for rare conditions - indirectly supports the notion that the NIH
has control over the direction of research. However, the authors’ data prevents them from
observing changes in application behavior at the NIH or constructing a valid counterfactual
post-award, which are both necessary for a full understanding of these interventions.
The outline of this Chapter is as follows: Section 2.2 describes the NIH setting and data;
Section 2.3 outlines a simple supply and demand model that clarifies the analyses; Section
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2.4 presents the difference-in-difference results on inducement; Section 2.5 presents the I.V.
regression results on productivity; Section 2.6 concludes.

2.2. Managing Research at the NIH
Although typically billed as the world’s largest funder of biomedical research, the NIH
has increasingly taken the role of as one of the world’s largest managers of research. In
2015, roughly 33% ($11B) of the research projects funded by the NIH were awarded via
solicitations for specific types of research, compared to roughly 5% in 1990. Figure 1 plots
the share of research project grants awarded via solicitations for specific science, as opposed
to investigator-initiated or “open” applications, which comprise the remainder of awards.
The “Focal Sample” on Figure 1 identifies the subset of Requests For Applications (RFAs)
- a specific solicitation mechanism at the NIH - that I examine in this Chapter.
Figure 1: Trends in Solicitation at the NIH

N ote: Data is based on the number of all research project grants awarded at the NIH. Solicitations are grants
awarded through certain mechanisms (e.g. Program Announcements, Requests For Applications (RFAs)),
which request specific types of science to be submitted. The “Focal” sample includes only the RFAs that are
empirically examined in this Chapter.

The traditional, continuously available open grant competitions at the NIH award research
grants three times per year. The application process is as follows. During each of these
rounds, an application is received by an NIH Institute sorted to one of the nearly 200
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standing or temporary peer review study sections of the NIH’s Center for Scientific Review.
Irrespective of the Institute that received the application, this sorting is determined by the
type of science proposed. For example, the “Biomedical Computing and Health Informatics”,
“Instrumentation and Systems Development” and “Genetics of Health and Disease” study
sections have all at some time reviewed applications from more than 20 separate NIH Institutes given their breadth of coverage. Within a study section, a peer review panel assigns
a raw score to each application, which is then transformed into a “percentile score” that is
intended to adjust for underlying differences across study sections as well as within study
sections over time4 . This is one of the primary ways through which the NIH exhibits a preference for equity across types of science. Final funding decisions each round are then based
at the Institute level, of which there are 24, where applications are ranked per their study
section percentile scores and funded as far down the percentile ranking as an Institute’s
budget permits5 .
It is extremely difficult to predict success in these open contests. The average application
receives its percentile score based on the quality of 75.6 (s.d.=108.3) other applications in its
study section, and competes with 707.9 (s.d.=843.4) other applications at the Institute level.
As evidence, the variance in success rates within scientists is more than twice as large as the
variance in average win rates across scientists. This is not driven by a bimodal distribution
of always-winners and always-losers: of the the 28,315 scientists with 3 to 5 applications in
my sample, only 66 were successful each time they applied. And the administrative costs
of developing applications and maintaining administrative responsibilities are not trivial. A
2007 survey found that academic scientists spend upwards of 20% of their time preparing
federal grant applications (Decker et al. 2007), with many academic institutions devoting
significant resources to NIH grant writing workshops and full-time staff to aid in these
proposals6 .
4

Formally, each applications percentile score is the percent of applications in the three prior rounds of the
same study section with raw review scores greater than the focal application’s raw score. Econometrically
speaking, this is analogous to using study section fixed effects as a control.
5
This is an approximation of the official funding process, which are outlined here: https://goo.gl/blLuuU.
6
A cottage industry of grant-writing consultants exists; see https://goo.gl/fpZ5zq.
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Compared to these open grant competitions, RFA competitions occur only once and request
a limited number of scientific subjects to be pursued and are thus a primary mechanism
through which targeted research is requested by staff at the NIH7 . In these one-time contests,
funds from one or more NIH Institutes are set aside for a single grant competition related
to the predefined area of science. The RFAs are typically announced four to eight months
prior to the deadline for submissions. Applications are evaluated by a single peer-review
panel and the awarding of grants is based on the number and quality of applications given
the amount of money allocated to the RFA8 . The average RFA includes $2.8 million to be
awarded annually over 3 to 5 years for 6 to 7grants, with an average of 37 scientists (s.d. =
58) participating in each contest. I provide more detailed statistics and discuss the typical
scope of these competitions in Section 3.3 below.
Figure 2 shows the share of the NIH’s total budget allocated to RFAs, and their average
success rates as compared to the unsolicited investigator-initiated grant mechanisms. To get
a sense, in 2014 the NIH awarded $1.03 billion in new grants via RFAs and an additional
$2.66 billion in continuing RFA grants for projects funded through multiple years. Section
2.2.2 below provides an overview of the reasons why this targeting occurs how forces are
relevant for my analyses.
I focus my empirical analyses on four of the most common research grant types awarded.
The set can be summarized by two distinct groups: basic and applied research. While
delineating between basic and applied science is a notoriously difficult exercise, the NIH
grant types provide relatively clear boundaries. Overall, the set of basic science grants are
the traditional funding mechanisms designed to support “discrete, specified, circumscribed
research projects”. The differences amongst these grants lies largely in the size of the award
7
The NIH also releases “Program Announcements” where certain types of science is solicited; however,
these calls are not accompanied by set-aside funds made specifically available for competition and in practice
vary widely in their format. I focus my analyses on RFAs because of their well-defined properties as funding
mechanisms.
8
The language typical to the grant announcements description of the number of awards is along the
lines of “...the [sponsoring Institute] expects to award X to Y grants, contingent upon the submission of a
sufficient number of scientifically meritorious applications and the availability of funds.”

9

Figure 2: RFA-Open Comparison

N ote: Data for all R-series grants studied in this Chapter (R01, R21, R41, R43), described at length in
text. The share of budget and awards is with respect to all new R-series grants awarded. A new grant is an
application submitted to fund a research project that has not previously received NIH funds in its current
state. After the first year of a multi-year grant award, scientists must re-apply for the continuation of funds
that were a part of the initial award, or to re-compete for additional years of funding; these continuing and
re-compete applications and awards are not included here.

and the stage of research (e.g. feasibility studies versus large-scale). The difference between
the two most common basic science grants, the R21 and the R01, is akin to the exploreexploit tradeoff commonly investigated in studies of R&D strategy. The larger R01 grants
are intended to support full-scale research projects that have preliminary results and build
on the scientists’ current base of knowledge (exploit). The smaller R21 grants are intended
to develop new lines of research and do not require any preliminary results (explore).
In contrast, the applied science grants are awarded through the NIH’s Small Business Technology Transfer and Small Business Innovation Research programs. These mechanisms are
designed to fund “cooperative research and development carried out between small business
concerns and research institutions” (R41) or “research and development for for-profit institutions for ideas that have potential for commercialization” (R43), obviously more applied
compared to the traditional grants of the NIH. The major difference between the two is
that the R41 mechanism requires participation from both a private entity and a research
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institution such as a University.
Within RFAs, the average total award size for the two basic grant types, R01 and R21,
are $1.3 million and $375,000, respectively, with the more applied grants averaging roughly
$200,000 for technology transfer R41 grants and $1 million for the commercial R43 grants. In
all cases, applicants may pursue these grants in the rolling open competitions. But notably,
the average size of these awards when awarded through the open contests is roughly 17-20%
smaller than the awards in the RFAs. The majority of applications (90%) and award dollars
(95%) are allocated via the basic science grants across both targeted and open contests.
Still, the NIH awards roughly 750 new applied grants ($900 million) each fiscal year. And
in light of recent evidence that federal grants awarded through a very similar program at
the Department of Energy can cause significant growth for early-stage ventures by spurring
investment from private sources (Howell 2015), understanding the extent to which these
grants can direct the nature of science at these ventures is an open and important public
policy question.
An important policy surrounding RFAs is that scientists are permitted to resubmit unsuccessful RFA applications to the open grant competitions, unlike submissions to the open
contests. This rule enables inter-temporal spillovers in application rounds following the contest. Scientists may be induced by the RFA to propose a research idea, fail, but receive
feedback useful in a future application. However, this also implies that RFAs may be a lowcost source of information regarding a proposal already in preparation, or simply provides
a second chance for the applications. Thus, there may also be inter-temporal substitution
from previous or future open application rounds as scientists delay or rush proposals already
in intended for submission. I will also examine potential substitution and spillover effects
across grant types (e.g. does soliciting R01 grants on subject A crowd-out R21 grants on
subject A?) as well as across similar types of science (e.g. is an increase in research proposed
on subject A associated with a decrease in research proposed on the similar subject B?).
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One other policy relevant for my analyses is the NIH’s New Investigator program9 . In order to prevent grant funds from being concentrated among older experienced investigators
where there are potentially less efficient (Levin and Stephan 1991; Freeman and Van Reenen
2009), the NIH explicitly labels individuals who have yet to successfully compete for a research grant as New Investigators. When making funding decisions (after peer review) for
open applications, these proposals are typically evaluated separately in order to maintain
comparable success rates among New and experienced investigators. However, this policy
does not hold in the targeted contest. While the theory of scientific choice described below will suggest that these younger, less experienced scientists may face lower costs when
adjusting the trajectory of their work and hence be more likely to compete in the targeted
contests, the lack of this feature may also prove a significant barrier. The raw data suggests
this preference for New Investigators in the open contests is valuable: only 14% of RFA
applications are from New Investigators, compared to 24% in the open contests.
2.2.1. Data Sources
Data on all grant applications to the NIH from 2006 to 2014 are from the NIH’s confidential
administrative database. The data contains all information surrounding each application:
abstract of the proposed research, review scores, funding decisions and project outcomes
(i.e. publications). Because the NIH’s protocol for review scores changed in the middle of
my sample period, I construct a new “grade” for each application based on the standardized
distributions of review scores before and after the protocol change. This grade variable
ranges from 0 to 1 and indicates the percent of all applications with lower review scores.
Controls introduced in my empirical analyses will capture any variation over time across
all applications in the propensity to award certain grades that may be unrelated to the
true quality of applications. The percentile score mentioned earlier is not useful for my
analyses because it is not utilized in RFA contests, and more importantly, while it would be
possible to impute these percentiles, I am interested in the raw application quality. Using the
9

See https://goo.gl/Ynd0W3 for the specific details of this program.
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unadjusted review scores allows me to implement my precise science-level controls without
limitations from the organization of NIH review groups or Institutes.
Details of each RFA from 2006 to 2014 was scraped from the NIH announcement website10 ,
and formatted as a dataset including each contest’s timing, text of the research objectives,
type of grants requested and the number of awards and dollars allocated.
Each scientist’s publication history, regardless of whether the project was NIH-funded, are
constructed using the disambiguated version of the PubMed scientific article database developed by Torvik and Smalheiser (2009). To address the notorious difficulties of accurately
matching publications to scientists given the lack of standardized identifiers in this data,
the authors developed a maximum likelihood based agglomerative algorithm for computing
clusters of articles that belong to the same inferred author. Thus, I am confident in the fidelity of my data, which is essential for the algorithms described below. To approximate the
quality of publication outcomes, Journal Citation Reports from Thompson Reuters is used
to obtain the impact factor and other citation-based metrics associated with each journal.
2.2.2. Targeted Contest Generation
Why do RFAs occur? For my empirical analyses to be generalizable to science not treated
with RFAs, it is important to identify the extent to which the creation of these contests
might be correlated with unobservable time-varying changes to the value associated with
each subject. To be clear, one might be concerned that events such as changes to the
prevalence of a disease or a scientific breakthrough might occur at the same time of the
NIH’s decision to request a particular type of science. In this case, estimating the effect of
RFAs would confound both the NIH’s intervention with this underlying change in the value
of that science to researchers, as the staff have effectively selected on these unobservable
dimensions of science. In this section, I discuss each impetus in terms of its relevance to my
empirical estimates - i.e. is selection of concern?
10

Available at https://goo.gl/LuaBOQ
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Discussions with NIH staff responsible for the creation and management of these solicitations identified two main reasons: political capital and portfolio analyses11 . The portfolio
analyses involve staff within each Institute evaluating the distribution of supported research
in order to identify “gaps” in the portfolio of funded work. The preference for equity in the
distribution of NIH-funded research suggests that these gaps likely exist because of lower
scientific fertility or demand associated with these subjects. Thus, to the extent that RFAs
are created by NIH staff in order to create a more uniform distribution of science, my estimates of inducement will be biased downward as a lower bound relative to the true average
effect across all subjects.
Interviewees also mentioned that the likelihood of an RFA being developed is often tied
to unplanned shocks to the budget. For reasons outside the control NIH program officials,
an Institute may have an unexpected amount of funds remaining after prior obligations
are met. This notion of RFAs being tied to budgetary slack is apparent in the aggregate
data: sharp increases in the number of targeted contests are apparent from 1997-2003 and
in 2009, during Congress’ “budget doubling” initiative and the American Reinvestment and
Recovery Act, respectively, where large surges to Institute budgets occurred (see Figure 2).
Because the NIH’s budget is Congressionally allocated at the very broad level of Institute,
it is unlikely that these Institute-wide budgetary shocks are correlated with the underlying
value of the specific biomedical subjects eventually requested by any RFA made possible by
these budgetary shocks.
To the notion of political capital, prior work has found that Congressional requests can
influence NIH funding allocations (Hegde and Sampat 2015). In fact, Hegde and Sampat
(2015) find that this influence is mediated largely via the targeted contests I study here.
To quote the authors, “Specific types of NIH grants - for example, ‘requests for application’
(RFAs) and ‘program announcement’ (PAs), which solicit research proposals in particular
11

As part of an NIH-sponsored internship, I worked on-site for roughly one month at the NIH Office of
Extramural Research where all funding opportunities and grant programs are approved. Informal interviews
were conducted with staff involved in the management of RFAs and other policies governing the granting
process.
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areas of research rather than unsolicited investigator-initiated research - are most strongly
related to soft earmarking” (Hegde and Sampat 2015, pp. 2282). Conducting an analysis
similar to Hegde and Sampat (2015), but using my data on subject occurrences in both
RFAs and appropriation bills, I am able to explicitly connect the soft earmarks for scientific
subjects to their appearance in the text of targeted funding opportunities. Subjects that
appear in these soft earmarks at least once in my sample are roughly 12 percentage points
(> 2 times) more likely to also appear in the text of the research objectives of the RFAs I
study, which occurs for only 5% of all subjects.
Overall these findings are in line with prior research on the determinants of the direction of
publicly funded research. Azoulay et al. (2015c) explore the impact of NIH grants around
random discontinuities that arise in the NIH’s budgeting process, but find little evidence
of “strategic” funding of grants with higher downstream potential12 . Similarly, Williams’
(2013) investigation of gene patents finds that publicly funded genetic sequencing efforts
did not appear to select on ex-ante more valuable genes. Certainly, public research efforts
do not occur at random. But taken together, there is good evidence to suggest that the
uncertainties of science and the influence of political interests appear to vastly overwhelm
any information that public officials may have about the most fruitful lines of research.
Still, the political capital associated with certain scientific subjects may be correlated with
the underlying value of scientific field. Recall the example of the recent Zika virus outbreak
in the Introduction. This (exogenous) occurrence drastically increased the inherent value of
research on this topic, particularly for US-based biomedical scientists. While my empirical
methods will control for fixed time-invariant differences across types of science, it is this sort
of shock that is problematic. In the case of Zika, Congress did in fact request research from
the NIH, and the NIH did in fact create an RFA soliciting research on the virus. In order
to identify the extent to which selection such as this is problematic, I construct a proxy for
12
“We add increasingly detailed fixed effects in each successive column; interestingly, our estimates remain
relatively stable. One explanation for this is consistency is that, at the time it makes funding decisions,
the NIH may not be able to anticipate which [areas of science] have greater future innovative potential.,”
Azoulay et al. (2015c), pp. 21-22.
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the political capital of each subject based on whether or not the term appears in any of
the Congressional appropriations bills from 2006-2013. I then rely on the fact that when
creating this contests, NIH staff must use more of a “shotgun” approach, rather than a “rifle”
approach to targeting specific areas of science. In the case of the RFA targeting Zika, it is
actually titled a request for “Countermeasures against Select Pathogens”, to include the Zika
virus, as well as vaccines with small market potential such as “Coccidioides spp.” infections.
By separately examining effects only for these subjects not requested by politicians but still
caught up in the creation of these contests, I assume that the RFA treatment is uncorrelated
with time-varying shocks to the value of these particular subjects. Statistical tests built into
my empirical specification will test this assumption.
Furthermore, by comparing differences in effects for the two sets of subjects (mentioned and
not mentioned by Congress) I can provide some insight as to the role of political capital
in the selection of government programs. This is an important empirical exercise given the
large number of studies in the social sciences that examine public programs and assume that
the decisions of government actors do not select on expectations of outcomes in a systematic
way13 .
2.2.3. Data Construction and Relevant Facts
A classic difficulty facing empirical studies of trends in science or innovation is accurately
identifying the unit of analysis. The problem lies in creating stable definitions of products,
markets or technologies and separating these units into control and treatment groups. Accurately and consistently defining these boundaries while also quantifying the proximity (or
similarity) between separate groups often requires strong assumptions when the unit of analysis is not obvious or evolves over time. Well-defined boundaries are important for making
clear statements about changes in outcomes over time, and understanding the proximity
between units is important for identifying spillovers or substitution effects, which are likely
13

For example, the parallel trends assumption of many district-based policy analyses implies that the
policy-makers who chose to enact a certain program or law were not able to select on features of their
population known to be positively correlated with the treatment effect or outcomes of interest.
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to come from “nearby” units when distance, be it physically or scientifically speaking, is an
important mediating factor.
Consider the RFAs I focus on in this study. How might one use the raw data to evaluate their
effect on the rate of science funded by the NIH? One method for categorizing applications at
the NIH used in prior studies is to combine the study sections and Institutes (discussed in
the prior section) to form “Disease-Science” units that can be traced over time (Azoulay et al.
2015c). However, because RFAs are one-time mechanisms they are not directly associated
with any particular study-sections and can be sponsored by multiple Institutes. Clearly
identifying treatment and control groups would be challenging. Furthermore, the grouping
of study sections and Institutes is based on the organizational structure of the NIH and
does not necessarily reflect the organization of science14 . So for example, if an RFA is seen
to receive ten applications it is not clear how to use this information to test whether or
not these ten applications - or more importantly, the specific types of science proposed by
these applications - would have occurred in the counterfactual scenario where no research
was targeted.
Thankfully, the hierarchical nature of information in the life sciences and the two algorithms
I utilize allow me to (1) accurately transform research projects into well-defined units: scientific subjects; and (2) quantify the distance, what I term scientific similarity, between any
pair of research projects. This enables me to build panels of data at the level of science
and scientist that facilitate difference-in-difference research designs. The remainder of this
section outlines how my main datasets are constructed and highlights patterns in the data
relevant to my research design. Here I succinctly discuss how the text algorithms operate
referring the interested reader to the Appendix for a detailed description of the algorithms
and their output.
14

For example, some Institutes are organized around diseases, National Cancer Institute, some around
science, National Institute of General Medical Sciences, and some around populations, National Institute of
Aging.
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2.2.4. Rate of Science
Indexing Science: MeSH and the MTI
The MeSH hierarchy is a vocabulary of biomedical subjects maintained by the National
Library of Medicine (NLM). The tree of terms has sixteen categories at its highest level, for
example “Diseases [C]” and “Chemicals and Drugs [D]” with up to twelve levels of detail below, for example “Spinal Neoplasms [C04.588.149.828]” and “Antigens, Fungal [D23.050.202]”.
Some terminology warrants definition: a superior is a term at a level above a given point, as
in closer to the highest sixteen categories, with a subordinate referring to the opposite; peers
are a set of terms that share the same direct superior one level above. Figure 3 provides a
sample portion of the hierarchy and illustrates these concepts.
Figure 3: MeSH Structure and Terminology

N ote: This is a very restricted section of the MeSH tree to demonstrate relevant terminology. Indentations
indicate separate levels of the hierarchy. For the most current, full MeSH tree visit https://goo.gl/zyeQ5z

The MeSH tree provides the well-defined boundaries for my units of analyses; however, as one
might intuit in Figure 3, there are obvious differences in the breadth of subjects depending
on their level within the tree. “Diseases” is a broad scientific subject that encompasses many
18

specific subjects such as “Diabetes mellitus, type 1”. Intuitively, the location of a subject
within the hierarchy is related to the breadth of the subject. However, the organization of
the tree varies widely across the major categories, so simply using a subjects level would
not be a consistent measure of subject specificity15 . Thus, I define broad subjects as the
highest two subordinates of the tree and specific subjects as those with no subordinates (see
Figure 3). Because changes to the rate with which subjects occur in my data will depend
largely on the breadth of a subject, my empirical analyses below estimates percent changes
in my outcomes. I will present specifications that separately examine broad and specific
subjects. Furthermore, each MeSH term also has a corresponding date of creation. With
this information, I have a proxy for how “new” a scientific field, an aspect of heterogeneity
that I will explore in the empirics. In total my set of MeSH subjects include 23,896 subjects,
94% of which are specific16 .
As mentioned earlier, the possibility of spillovers or substitution effects is most often mediated by the similarity between two units. When testing for these effects within subjects,
my data allows me to look over time and across grant types. When testing for these effects
across subjects, I focus on the peer subjects given their obvious proximity in the scientific
sense. Referring again to Figure 3, it is reasonable to assume that an RFA requesting research on “Diabetic angiopathies” would most likely substitute for or spillover into research
related to other diabetic complications.
Because it is commonplace for multiple words to refer to the same fundamental MeSH term
(e.g. cancer, tumor and neoplasm) accurately matching free-form text to a unique MeSH
term is a difficult task, particularly for large datasets. Previous work that has utilized the
MeSH vocabulary as a means of indexing science has relied individual librarians to handcode text (Boudreau et al. 2016a). To overcome this challenge at the scale of my data, I
15

For example, “Human” has ten superior terms
while both are equally specific subjects in the sense
16
The online Appendix outlines how I arrived at
ing subjects obviously less valuable to the progress
Drawings”.

and “Bronchiolitis, Viral” has only two superior terms
they have no subordinates
the final sample of MeSH terms, essentially, by removof science, such as “Tape Recording” or “Architectural
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employ the Medical Text Indexer (MTI) developed at the NLM (Mork et al. 2013) in order
to index abstracts automatically. The MTI utilizes a machine-learning approach to parse
and index words in order to identify the unique set of MeSH terms relevant to a body of
text17 . For example, the sentence “Clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats
are segments of prokaryotic DNA containing short repetitions of base sequences” is identified
as being related to “base sequence”, “CRISPR”, “DNA” and “genetics”. Note that while the
word “genetics” does not appear in the sentence, the MTI is able to identify its relevance.
One may be concerned that the appearance of certain terms within, say a grant application, is
not necessarily indicative as to the actual science proposed. For example, many applications
mention the potential implications of their findings in the closing sentence of their abstracts
(e.g. “our findings on X may be relevant to diseases A, B and C”). To adjust for the inclusion
of terms likely to be less relevant to the true nature of the study, I conduct robustness tests
of my analyses where I restrict my sample to subjects identified by the MTI as being most
relevant to the input text18 . Furthermore, when examining publication outcomes, I directly
process the abstracts of articles funded by the grants and do not rely on the application
abstract. This allows for the possibility that the true nature of a project are not accurately
captured by the proposed abstract.
Dataset & Patterns: Science
The first dataset I construct is based on the MTI algorithm and is used to identify the aggregate effects of RFAs on the rate of science proposed, funded and published at the NIH. Each
abstract from grant applications and publications (connected to successful applications) is
processed by the MTI to identify the MeSH terms associated with each project, successful
or not. The count of these terms - what I refer to as the rate of science - is collapsed to the
17

The MTI is accessible at https://ii.nlm.nih.gov/MTI.
The MTI ranks and scores the relevance of each term identified based on its number of occurrences and
the confidence of the machine-learning algorithm. By limiting the output to the words with higher rank or
score, per some cutoff, can identify the subjects most relevant. Conversations with Dr. James Mork of the
NLM team who maintains the MTI (Mork et al. 2013) assisted in the use and interpretation of the MTI’s
output.
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grant type (e.g. R01, R41) by application round level. The resulting dataset is comprised
of 23,896 subjects for each of the 4 grant types spanning 25 application rounds from 2006 to
2014. The average rate of occurrence in each round for broad subjects for the three measures
- all applications, successful applications and resulting publications - is 105.3 (sd=441.0),
15.5 (sd= 64.6) and 21.8 (sd=126.0), respectively. Likewise, the average rates for specific
subjects are 3.6 (sd=29.7), 0.53 (sd=4.3) and 0.88 (sd=8.9), respectively.
Next, the “Research Objectives” section of each RFA announcement is processed by the
MTI in order to identify the scientific subjects requested by the contest. In total, I examine 854 RFAs of which 85.7% utilize basic grant types with the remainder requesting
commercial grant types. The average number of subjects identified (treated) in each RFA
is 90.7 (sd=37.2) with the share of subjects requested per their major MeSH categories as
follows: 8% anatomy; 6% organisms; 12% diseases; 16% drugs or chemicals; 23% techniques
or equipment; 17% psychology or psychiatry; and 18% phenomena or processes.
Table 1: Summary Statistics of RFAs by Grant Type

Awards
Announced

Basic
R01
R21
7.68
15.4
(5.09) (11.3)

Commercial
R41
R43
4.89
6.00
(1.01) (2.13)

Awards
Actual

5.92
(5.63)

6.05
(6.51)

0.92
(1.26)

3.37
(5.06)

Applications
Received

36.8
(51.2)

41.5
(49.0)

4.54
(3.87)

22.6
(66.1)

Total $M FY
Announced

3.48
(3.61)

2.13
(1.36)

1.20
(0.76)

1.74
(1.05)

Total $M FY
Actual
Avg. grant
duration
N

3.03
(3.39)
4.06
(1.05)
531

1.35
(1.49)
2.10
(0.55)
272

0.19
(0.28)
1.16
(0.37)
39

0.71
(1.08)
1.30
(0.46)
99

N ote: Standard deviations in parentheses. Total $M FY is
the total value of all grants awarded in the first fiscal year of
the RFA in millions. Announced statistics are from texts of
the RFA announcements, actual statistics are based on the
final awards. Duration is the number of fiscal years a grant is
planned for at time of awarding. Grant types are defined in
text.
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Table 1 summarizes the explicit parameters of each RFA (e.g. award number and size) as well
as the realized number of applications and awards. In general, these contests tend to receive
two to five times as many applications as awards, and award fewer grants than announced.
There is significant variation across the types of grants in terms of responsiveness. For
example, the most common basic science grant (R01) receives nearly five applications for
every award announced. Conversely, the technology transfer grant (R41) RFAs receives
roughly the same number of applications as awards announced on average. This is initial
evidence that even those applications that are received are quite often of lower quality. These
technology transfer grants are not solicited in RFAs very frequently (N =39); however, these
low response and award rates are indicative of significant difficulties in inducing research
that bridges academic and commercial ventures. Still, the raw statistics cannot separately
identify whether or not this is because the NIH typically targets scientific subjects that are
inherently difficult to translate, or the act of inducing this translation is inherently difficult.
Constructing variables to perfectly capture the nature of each RFA would be a difficult
task given the number of parameters associated with each contest (e.g. number of expected
awards, total award purse, limitations on grant size, limitations on grant length, total scope
of the RFA, sponsoring Institute, etc.). To simplify the analyses I instead create a single
indicator variable for whether or not a subject is requested in an RFA. There is not a
tremendous amount of variation in the number or size of awards for RFAs using the same
grant type, so this simplification does not remove an excessive amount of information and
facilitates a simpler interpretation in the empirical analyses: what is the average change in
the rate of science for a subject solicited by the average RFA?
To investigate variation within and across these rates, Figure 4 plots the adjusted R2 from
OLS regressions of the rate of subject occurrences on increasingly detailed levels of fixed
effects for each subject using each of the three main outcomes in this dataset. By levels, I
refer to the subject groupings superior to each subject. For example, in Figure 4 the level 1
control for “Diabetes mellitus, type 1” is “Diseases”, the level 2 control is “Endocrine system
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Figure 4: Out-of-Sample Variation Explained by Subject Fixed Effects

Note: The rate of science is the number of times a subject occurs in the text of abstracts from each source
(all NIH applications, funded NIH applications and publications connected to funded NIH applications).
The levels of the fixed effects are based on the MeSH structure with higher levels indicating more specific
fixed effects and are described in detail in the text. The adjusted R2 is from OLS regressions of the rate of
science in each application round on different levels of the subject fixed effects estimated using two different
hold-out samples. In Panel A, the fixed effects are estimated in the first half of the sample (2006 to mid-2010)
and used as explanatory variables in the second half (mid-2010 to 2014). In Panel B, the fixed effects are
estimated on a randomly selected half of the sample, and used as explanatory variables on the remainder of
the sample.

diseases” and so on. In Panel A, I first estimate the fixed effects using the first half of
the data and regress these estimates on the rates for the second half of the data. Panel B
replicates this exercise using a random sample for the first estimation. In both cases, the
full set of time-invariant fixed effects explain the vast majority (>80%) of variation in the
rate of science that occurs in applications and nearly half of the variation in publication
outcomes. Given that this data spans eight years, it is evidence that significant shocks to
the opportunities within scientific subjects do not occur frequently. Conversely, it is also
implies that any of the NIH’s efforts to influence these rates, at least within applications,
have not had any dramatic effects.
This notion that technological trajectories are relatively stable and incremental in nature
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(Dosi 1982) until infrequent punctuated equilibrium events spur major changes (Levinthal
1998) has been appreciated for some time, and these patterns tell a similar story. Furthermore, the large discrepancy in explanatory power between the simpler and most refined
categorizations indicates that controlling for these fixed differences is empirically relevant.

2.3. Theoretical Motivations
This section outlines a simple supply-demand model that describes the effects to be estimated, emphasizes how frictions could prevent price shocks from inducing quantity changes,
and highlights identification concerns relevant to the empirical analyses. A selection model
is also referenced in order to predict heterogeneity in supply curves across science and scientists.
2.3.1. Supply and Demand of Science
To fix ideas and clarify the main effects estimated in this Chapter, consider an economy with
a single scientific subject that may be pursued by a fixed number of scientists who generate
new knowledge on the subject, one public consumer i = 0 and many private consumers
i = (1, 2, ..., I) of knowledge. Given the large number of consumers and scientists, both will
be treated as price-takers19 .
There are two, connected markets that facilitate (1) the funding of ideas, and then (2) the
implementation of ideas to generate new knowledge. This two-part production occurs since
the consumers cannot themselves directly identify production possibilities and the scientists
face large input constraints, but consolidation is not feasible given information asymmetries,
preference differences and the contractual frictions they create (Aghion et al. 2008; Lacetera
2009).
In the first market for ideas, demand is a function of the price of ideas p1 , exogenous
features of the knowledge these ideas may generate D (e.g. disease burden if the subject is
19
Despite the fact that the NIH is the single-largest funder of biomedical research, it still only accounts
for roughly 20% of basic research in the U.S.
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an illness), and the budgets of each consumer xi = Xi (·). Importantly, the ultimate good
produced - information - is, essentially, a public good. Therefore, purchasing an idea does
not exclude other consumers from utilizing the knowledge it may generate. Thus, given the
incentives not to duplicate investments, each consumer can strategically set their budget
as a best response to the vector of budget decisions made by other consumers, denoted by
x−i , and their own private demand shocks. This introduces the crowd-out (or crowd-in)
problem common to most public subsidies20 . Ideas are supplied based on their price, as well
as exogenous technologies S (e.g. random discoveries)21 . This gives supply and demand in
the market for ideas at time t,

X
 D
Xi x−i , D
q D1 =D1 p1 ,
it , t

(2.1.1)

i



q S1 =S 1 p1 , St

(2.1.2)

In the final market for knowledge, demand is a function of the price of knowledge p2 and
the exogenous demand-side features of the subject D . The supply of knowledge depends
on price, exogenous technologies S and the amount of inputs committed to production
y = Y (p1∗ , q 1∗ ) per equilibrium outcomes in the first market. That y is simply not p1∗ × q 1∗
reflects the contractual issues highlighted by Aghion et al. (2008) - funders will relinquish
some control over inputs in order to avoid hold-up in production.
The specific amount of inputs generated by each consumer yi can be viewed as consumer-level
1∗
equilibrium outcomes in the initial idea market (p1∗
i , qi ), which equal either the equilibrium

values (p1∗ , q 1∗ ) if the consumer funded an idea, or (0 , 0) otherwise. This gives supply and
20
These resource choices are analogous to the income of consumers in a traditional market, except the
consumers here can choose how much of their “income” to allocate to science, given the value of the outside
option. This implies that D is scaled by the value of investing resources elsewhere - not science.
21
Certainly, most discoveries are not random, but rather the endogenous outcomes of previous investments
in ideas. However, the goal of this model is to emphasize the static effects of consumer behaviors since data
limitations prevent empirically exploring long-term outcomes.
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demand in the market for knowledge at time t,


q D2 =D2 p2 , D
t

X
 S
1∗
q S2 =S 2 p2 ,
Yi p1∗
, t
i , qi

(2.2.1)
(2.2.2)

i

and the equilibrium knowledge production, q 2∗ , occurring when supply and demand in both
markets are equivalent22 .
When the public manager chooses to increase the resources available for scientists (∂x0 >
0), the implicit assumptions are that (1) after accounting for other consumers’ strategic
responses, the aggregate demand for ideas will increase (i.e. no full crowd-out); (2) the
equilibrium price and/or quantity of ideas will increase (i.e. supply of ideas is elastic); (3)
the additional inputs will be committed to successful production (i.e. supply of knowledge
is elastic). Figure 5 demonstrates the two markets and this potential cascade of effects.
In the context of this model and given data limitations, the three main treatment effects I
estimate empirically are:
1. ∂q01∗ /∂x0 : change in public ideas for the subject
2. ∂p1∗
0 /∂x0 : change in public funds allocated to the subject
3. ∂q 2∗ /∂x0 : change in total knowledge on the subject
Since private investments are rarely disclosed, changes at the first two stages are only observable for the NIH, and thus only shifts in this subset of the idea supply curve will be
identified. But given the dominant role of the NIH in the funding of biomedical science,
these effects are still of policy interest. And since my final output measure - peer-reviewed
22

Standard assumptions about functions D, S, X and Y can be made to ensure a unique equilibrium
exists. A detailed characterization of this equilibrium is beyond the scope of this Chapter, since the objective
is to simply test if the public manager can change the equilibrium quantity of knowledge supplied. That at
least a stable equilibrium should exist is supported by the fact that the consumer shares (e.g. across public
and private) of investments in biomedical research have remained relatively constant over the past decades
(Moses et al. 2015).
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Figure 5: Two-Stage Markets of Science
Panel A:
Market for Ideas

Panel B:
Market for Knowledge

N ote: In the market for ideas, consumers fund production possibilities for the
market for knowledge. Equations (2.1 - 2.2) detail the supply and demand
functions. The treatment evaluated in this Chapter is the potential demand
0
shift in the first market (D1 → D1 ) that may be induced by the NIH’s targeted
allocations, given other consumers’ responses. The ultimate treatment effect of
0
interest is the quantity change in the second market (q2∗ → q2∗ ).

publications - are observable regardless of funding source, I can still estimate the ultimate
effect on total quantity. Thus, in terms of the canonical supply-demand model, this third
effect can be interpreted as the income elasticity of supply.
To recall Arrow and Nelson’s point, solving the underinvestment problem necessitates that
for each specific scientific subject j,

2∗
∂qjt
∂x0jt

> 0. Allowing for multiple subjects in the model

introduces the possibility of substitution or complementarities at any stage of production.
Thus, when estimating the three effects it will be important to separate the extent to which
changes are on the extensive margin - no science - or intensive margin - different subjects.
In terms of generalizability, my estimates of these elasticities will be linear approximations
local to the magnitudes of ∂x0jt I observe at the NIH. Although drawn as linear functions in
Figure 5, there is no reason to assume this is the case for the full distribution of prices and
quantities. Still, the major goal of this Chapter is to test the null hypotheses that
given the lack of causal evidence to the contrary.
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2∗
∂qjt
∂x0jt

=0

2.3.2. Frictions of Science
That a price shock would influence quantities in a neoclassical economy is certainly trivial.
However, given the particulars of this market, it far from clear that price shocks can be
generated by the public manager that are salient and sizable enough to induce a quantity
response. The main complications of public science and scientists are: (1) that the public
consumer’s allocations occur amongst other (private) strategic consumers; (2) the indirect
connection between allocation and production that is moderated by competitions (e.g. grant
contests); (3) scientists suffer from similar appropriability limitations as private firms and
(4) the supply of scientists is highly constrained both in terms of total number and their
ability to pursue new subjects.
2.3.3. Treatment Magnitude & Heterogeneity
Treatment Magnitude
My empirical specification will formalize treatment - ∂x0jt - as subject j being solicited in
a targeted grant contest. Per the contest selection model of Appendix 2.3.4, the magnitude
of this treatment is based on differences in the size and scope across the targeted and open
contests. The approximate differences are as follows23 : the average open contests award
85 new grants, $30 million and utilize 50 different scientific review sections (a proxy for
the scientific scope of competition); the average RFA awards 7 new grants, $3 million and
utilizes a single review section. Loosely speaking, RFAs are 10% the size and 2% the scope
of the standard contests utilized at the NIH.
Predicted Heterogeneity
As highlighted in Appendix 2.3.4, the types of science and scientists that should be most
responsive to the targeted contests are those where the correlation in outcomes are the
23

Generating precise estimates of these parameters is challenging given the complexity of the NIH’s
policies. The assumptions used to arrive at these values are in line with the “rules of thumb” used by NIH
applicants based on discussion with NIH staff.
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highest - the costs of redirection are the lowest. How might this play out across the hierarchy
of scientific subjects? Intuitively, inducing redirections across broader subjects at the top
of the hierarchy (e.g. Diseases or Organisms) would necessitate larger levels of redirection
compared to the changes necessary to transition from one specific subject to another (e.g.
Diabetes mellitus, type 1 or Diabetes mellitus, type 2). Should we expect any variation in
redirection costs as a function of the “age” of a subject? In other words, is it more or less
difficult to redirect scientists towards new areas of science? Intuitively, newly discovered
subjects will have a smaller base of information from which scientists could source ideas
from. However, following the arguments of Jones (2009), pushing the frontiers of knowledge
forward might also be easier in the case of new subjects that lack a great depth of existing
knowledge. Which, if either, of these countervailing forces dominate in this setting is an
empirical question.
What types of scientists should have the lowest costs of redirection? It has been shown that
the incentives for scientific effort in general decline over time (Levin and Stephan 1991).
Furthermore, to the extent that one’s prior research endeavors shape and constrain the search
and evaluation of new ideas (Nelson and Winter 1982; Levinthal 1997; Gavetti and Levinthal
2000), more experienced scientists would face greater costs of redirecting their work. Thus,
we would expect less experienced researchers to be most responsive to the targeted contests.
Data limitations prevent me from evaluating specific dimensions of experience (e.g. age,
years active), but one observable variable is the NIH’s “New Investigator” designation assigned to individuals who have not yet successfully competed for an NIH research project
grant. While this policy selects on both dimensions of experience, age as well as ability to
compete at the NIH, it provides a clear and policy-relevant way of delineating applications
from those who I expect to be less constrained in their redirections.
2.3.4. Selection Model of Contests
This section reframes the targeted-open contest entry decision in the format of the RoyBorjas (1951; 1987) models of self-selection. I consider a population of specialized individuals
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who may choose to compete for prizes in a contests offered by the manager, or receive their
outside option ui . In these contests individuals submit a single new idea of a certain type t.
Two contests k exist, an “open” contest k = 0 that permits ideas of any type t = (1, 2, ..., T0 )
and a “targeted” contest k = 1 that permits a subset of types, such that T1 ≤ T0 . Thus,
the “scope” of a contest is given by Tk . The manager’s objective in creating the targeted
contest is to increase the rate at which individuals pursue types the types made eligible
in this contest. This is analogous to the investigator-initiated (open) and RFA (targeted)
contests of the NIH.
I assume the expected value of the contest is given by the contest average µk (e.g. prize
structure), a type average within either contest νkt (e.g. the relative ease with which a
subject is pursued) and an individual-type performance component ikt that captures all
individual-level variation from the contest and type means (e.g. individual’s abilities or
preferences) such that the expected payoff of each contest is summarized by:

Uikt = µk + νkt + ikt − ui

(2.3)

where ikt ∼ N (0, σk2 ). Individuals entering the targeted contest must incur fixed costs,
C, which may be negative. Let t∗ik be the type with the highest payoff for each individualcontest pair. Following Borjas, C can be adjusted to include the opportunity costs by scaling
C by the value of the default contest: πi =

C
Ui0t∗ .

Individuals know their ikt , πi and ui .

Each individual is extremely small relative to the full set of potential entrants24 , so while
individuals may form strategic expectations, I assume any resulting general equilibrium
effects are negligible. Individuals will enter the targeted contests when

(µ1 + ν1t∗ − µ0 − ν0t∗ − πi ) + (i1t∗ − i0t∗ ) > ui

(2.4)

It is straightforward to show that this model predicts increasing entry as the relative value of
24
The number of unique applicants to the NIH during my eight-year time period is roughly 80,000
scientists. Using a narrower definition of potential entrants, each of the 24 Institutes receive applications
from roughly 1,700 unique scientists each year.
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the new contest grows (µ1 +ν1t∗ −µ0 −ν0t∗ ), or fixed costs C decline, importantly, irrespective
of the average correlation in individual’s performance across the contests, ρ =

cov(σ1 ,σ0 )
.
σ1 σ0

My

empirical analysis in Section 3.4 treats the prize structure of the targeted contests as a
constant - treatment is binary - so I do not empirically explore variation in this regard.
However, this model also implies that the targeted contests should see larger entry when
the set of subjects targeted have the lowest relative payoffs in the open contest. In this
case, because competition is relative across types per νkt , the rate of entry into the targeted
contest will be increasing in

P
ν1t /T1
Pt 1
.
t ν0t /T0

Essentially, if competition is restricted to types

0

that, on average, fair worse in competitions amongst the full set of types, the relative value
of the restricted competition will be larger. Here, the narrower scope essentially “levels”
competition, with the value of this leveling being greatest for those types that have the
smallest ν0t . In Section 3.4, I proxy for ν0t with the success rate of each type prior to the
announcement of the targeted competition. In line with this prediction, the RFAs have
the largest effects for scientific subjects with prior success rates in the lower quartile. The
analyses in Section 3.5 sheds light on the sign and magnitude of C. Interestingly, the results
suggest that, conditional on differences in µk , the targeted contests may in fact be preferred;
or in the context of this model, that is to say, C is negative.
To consider how individuals might sort between the two contests, we need to consider differences in the distributions of random variables per σk and their correlation in the population,
ρ. How might the difference in scope influence the distributions or correlations of individuals’
returns, or in other words, what is the partial derivatives

∂σ1
∂T1

and

∂ρ
∂T1 ?

This will depend on the extent to which individuals are constrained in pursuing ideas of
different types. For example, assuming that individuals can costlessly pursue an idea of any
type, then restricting competition to any sized subset of types will not influence ρ for any
particular individuals or types. Specifically, both of the partial derivatives will be zero, and
the effect of the targeted contest will only depend on

µ1 +ν1t∗
µ0 −ν0t∗

and C.

However, if individuals are constrained in their ability or willingness to pursue different
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types of ideas, then it is implied that

∂ρ
∂T1

> 1, where smaller scopes lead to a reduction in

the population average ρ. Furthermore, if this reduction in ρ occurs differentially across the
population, as it would if ρi was say, a function of the similarity between an individuals’ past
and chosen type, then

∂σ1
∂T1

< 1. Consider the limit cases; as T1 % T0 all individuals will face

the same returns in either contest, conditional on µk , and therefore σ1 & σ0 . Conversely, as
T1 & 1 (scope narrows), the individuals for whom ρi decreases the least will see relatively
higher returns in the targeted contest and σ1 % ∞. Therefore, the types of science and
scientists that would be most responsive to a targeted contest will be the individuals or
types for which ρ is reduced the least given the scope reduction and growth in σ1 . Whether
or not this reduced scope can induce an overall increase in the rate at which targeted types
are pursued will then depend on the distribution of individuals and how they sort across
contests.
In this case where it is assumed that the scope reduction implies that σ1 > σ0 , sorting may
occur via “positive” or “inverse” 25 sorting where either the most able in the open contest
(highest i0t∗ ) or least able (lowest i0t∗ ) participate in the targeted contest, respectively.
The direction of this selection will depend on whether ρ is greater or less than minimum
ratio of the returns, m = ( σσ01 ,

σ0
σ1 ).

If ρ > m, then the average returns across contests are

still sufficiently correlated following the scope reduction, and positive sorting will occur; vice
versa for inverse sorting. At the NIH, the direction of this sorting will determine whether or
not RFAs can induce new applications where individuals pursue new ideas (inverse sorting)
or if the RFAs simply crowd-out funding that would have been acquired in the open contests
(positive sorting).
Thus, to reframe the objective of the manager, the premise of targeted contests is to create
inverse sorting - managers raise the incentives associated with particular lines of work in
hopes of inducing new entrants that would not have otherwise pursued the targeted work.
However, if when this inverse sorting occurs the individuals select from “too low” in the
25

Borjas uses the term “refugee” to describe inverse sorting.
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distribution of returns, then the quality of individuals induced by the new contest may be
low enough that the manager does not value the additional work given the costs. Conversely,
if positive sorting is too strong, then to the extent that the high quality individuals already
exist in the targeted field, they will capture the targeted resources and the manager will
not solicit any new work. This balance of structuring targeted prizes such that they induce
new work without crowding out existing work closely mimics the results of low-powered
incentives being optimal in many multi-task settings (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991)26
In summary, the effect of providing a narrower contest amidst the presence of an “open”
contest will depend on the relative sizes of the contest, and to the extent that individuals
are constrained in their selection of types, the relative scopes of the contest.

2.4. Aggregate Analysis: Rate of Science
2.4.1. Motivating Theory & Empirics
The NIH’s objective is to increase the rate at which scientists successfully compete for research grants related to certain scientific subjects. To do so, an RFA is created, consisting of
a certain amount of grant funds to be competed for only by proposals related to those subjects. Importantly, the RFAs occur amidst the continually available investigator-initiated
“open” contests at the NIH, where any subject may be pursued. Thus, the RFAs operate conditional on the features of this key outside option27 . How might the creation of
these targeted contests influence the overall rate at which targeted subjects are pursued, or
successfully pursued, at the NIH?
In general, there are four scenarios that may occur: either there is no change from the counterfactual rate of science because no new applications are induced and scientists completely
26

Aghion et al. (2008) explore this sort of tradeoff precisely in the setting of academic scientists.
Certainly, the landscape of funding opportunities for biomedical scientists includes numerous other
public and private entities, which may selectively fund certain subjects, e.g. the American Cancer Society. I
will assume that conditional on the controls in my empirical specification, which include subject fixed effects
and time dummies, any changes in the value of these outside-the-NIH options are uncorrelated with RFA
generations.
27
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substitute the RFA for the open contest, or complete substitution does not occur and (1) no
new applications are induced, so the RFA funds the marginally worse proposal, per ex-ante
quality, that would have been unsuccessfully submitted otherwise; (2) new applications are
induced; however, these new proposals are of too low quality to be successful and the targeted allocations again fund those that would have been submitted otherwise; and (3) new
applications are induced and the new proposals are of high enough quality that, at least
some, are successful. Table 2 outlines these scenarios clearly.
Table 2: Inducement Scenarios

Note: This Table represents the three general outcomes possible in response to a targeted contest. In the counterfactual scenario, the focal
scientific subject is not treated with any inducement prizes, proposals
are awarded based on their relative quality (q) with existing resources
enabling the funding of the single best proposal. In columns (1) - (3),
a targeted contest is held that also awards a single proposal of highest
quality. In these scenarios, new proposals or successful proposals made
possible by the targeted contest are indicated by N.

From the standpoint of what I can test in the data, distinguishing between outcome (1)
and the other scenarios is a straightforward question: do application rates increase for the
targeted subject? Although a simple test, it is far from obvious that such inducement
would occur given the aforementioned constraints facing scientists. Distinguishing between
scenarios (2) and (3) is important because it will indicate the extent to which the NIH can
induce new, quality ideas. However, with my data of realized outcomes it is impossible
to determine whether a specific application would have been submitted in absence of the
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RFA28 . We can get a sense of the extent to which the RFA induces new proposals that are in
fact successful by comparing the size of the application effect to the size of the award effect.
If the induced science is of very low quality (as in Scenario 2), then I should observe a larger
change in the number of awards mentioning the targeted science relative to the change in
total applications. Conversely, if the new science is significantly higher in quality compared
to the counterfactual science (as in Scenario 3), then the change in total applications should
be larger. To the extent the induced applications are of equal quality as the counterfactual
applications, then the two effects will be equivalent.
To inform the conditions under which these different scenarios may occur, Appendix 2.3.4
reframes Borjas’s (1987) model of self-selection as the choice between RFAs and the open
contests. The model implies that the value of these targeted grant competitions will depend
on their relative size and, to the extent that scientists are constrained in their abilities to
pursue different types of science, their relative scope. Exploring the magnitude of these
constraints is the focus of Section 3.5.
Empirical Specification
To recall, the dataset for this analysis is a panel of observations at the subject (s) grant type
(j) 4-month application round (t) level. My outcomes of interest (y) are the rate of subject
occurrences in (1) all applications, (2) funded applications (awards) and (3) publications
from funded applications. In order to identify the effect of being soliciting in an RFA, I
estimate the expected rate of science within each subject as:

E[ysjt |βb , γs , τjt ] = exp

t+3
X

βb · 1{RFAsjt } + γs + τjt



(2.5)

b=t−3

where the independent variable of interest 1{RFAsjt } is a binary variable equaling 1 if an
RFA requests subject s with grant type j to be funded in application round t. The main
treatment effect of interest, described previously, is given by βt=0 .
28

This is because applications mentioning targeted subjects can still be submitted to the open contests.
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I allow for dynamic effects of the RFAs in order to capture any inter-temporal spillovers
or substitution effects during the announcement phase b = (t − 1) and in the application
rounds immediately after the targeted grants are awarded b = (t + 1, t + 2, t + 3)29 . The
subject fixed effects γs control for all time-invariant differences across each subject and the
application round-grant type fixed effects τjt control for any time-varying differences across
all observations in each round for each type of grant (e.g. R01).
My main assumption is that the change in the rate of science for subjects not treated with
an RFA in a given round are valid estimates of the counterfactual change in rate of science
for treated subjects had they not been targeted with an RFA, conditional on their mean
differences. Letting sjt be the error term in the estimation, then the major threat to this
assumption is a correlation between the creation of RFAs and the time-varying subject-grant
specific factors sjt ; this is the aforementioned concern regarding the NIH’s selection of which
subjects to target. As discussed in Section 3.2, RFAs are not generated at random but do
appear to occur for reasons likely unrelated to the changes in the unobservable value of
particular subjects. The coefficients βb=t−2,t−3 provide a statistical tests for this assumption
where rejecting the null would indicate the presence of pre-existing trends, evidence that
my assumption may be invalid.
I use the Poisson specification, where estimated coefficients capture the percent changes in
the outcomes, for two reasons: first, as discussed previously, the change in rate of science
within subjects will depend largely on factors unique to each subject such as the breadth
of science it entails; and second, more practically speaking, the Poisson model handles the
high degree of positive skewness, the non-negativity of outcomes and frequent zero values
(approximately 30%) without requiring the transformations necessary to estimate linear
models or the simultaneous estimation of extensive and intensive margin effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the subject (j) level in all specifications to account for possible serial29

The application rounds are roughly four months in length and RFAs are announced six months prior to
the deadline on average, which extends from the focal application round (b = t) to the prior round (b = t−1).
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correlation in the error terms within subjects30 .
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Subject-Level Rate of Science Outcomes
All
Subjects
22.79
(55.84)

Treated
Subjects
47.20
(72.31)

Diff.
(Treat.-All)
24.41***

Awards

3.28
(8.310)

6.77
(10.83)

3.48***

Publications

5.29
(20.81)

11.05
(31.04)

5.76***

Ever RFA

17.0%

100%

-

592,800

100,850

Applications

Obs.

N ote: Rows (1) - (3) indicate the count of abstracts referencing each of the scientific subjects. Mean values at the
subject-application round level, standard deviations in parentheses. Awards are successful applications, publications are
all subsequent publications in the top 500 biomedical journals
(per Journal Impact Factor) generated by awards in a given
application round. *** p<0.01.

Table 3 presents the mean values of the three main outcomes (applications, awards, and
subsequent publications) at the subject-level. Notably, the rate of subject occurrence in
all outcomes is roughly twice as large for those subjects treated by RFAs. However, using
the non-RFA treated subjects as the counterfactual control groups in my estimation will
be valid so long as these differences do not persist conditional on the the subject-level and
time-trend fixed effects.
2.4.2. Results: Main Treatment Effects
To make the difference-in-difference results clear, it is useful to first observe the raw trends
in the rate of science for the treatment and control subjects in the sample. A straightforward pre- post- plot is not possible given the staggered treatment occurrence where a subset
of treated subjects are requested in RFAs each application round. Figure 6 accommodates
30
Thus, this level of clustering spans multiple panels (each grant type) and also makes the estimation
of the standard errors robust to violation of the equidispersion assumption underlying Poisson regressions.
To be clear, this assumption is relevant only for consistent estimates of the standard errors and not the
coefficients.
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this by plotting the average percent growth in the rate of science for (1) control subjects,
(2) treated subjects in non-RFA-treated rounds, and (3) treated subjects in RFA-treated
rounds31 . Clearly, when not requested in an RFA the treated subjects behave very similarly to the control subjects. This implies that both pre-treatment trends are likely similar
across the two groups, and interestingly, that post-treatment (the rounds following an RFA)
spillovers are likely not significant32 .
Figure 6: Raw Difference-in-Difference of Rates of Science

N ote: Rate of Science is the count of applications mentioning each subject in each 4-month application
round. Percent growth is relative to the first round in the data.

Figure 7 plots the βb coefficients estimated in Equation 2.5 for the basic and commercial
science grants using the two application outcomes, total and successful (awards). Given the
political nature of the NIH allocation system discussed in Section 3.2, these main results
are based on subjects not found to have political capital per my proxy. Below, I test for the
31

Displaying average percent growth in this manner effectively incorporates the subject-level fixed effects
into this plot.
32
Separating the treated subject non-RFA-round trend into pre- and post-RFA subsets reveals no significant difference in the levels.
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Figure 7: RFA Treatment Effects, Application Outcomes

N ote: βb coefficients from estimating Equation 2.5 with full set of fixed effects; zero indicating the scientific
subject’s mean rate of occurrence in applications submitted each round, conditional on time trends across
all subjects. Awards are successful applications. Application rounds are approximately four months. Grant
types outlined in text.

presence of any selection bias associated with this political capital. The βb=t−2,t−3 estimates
indicate that prior to the announcement of the RFA, the rate of science for each subject was
not significantly different from zero, conditional on their mean rates (subject fixed effects)
and temporal trends (time fixed effects), providing support for the main assumption of this
specification. The magnitudes of these coefficients indicate that being requested in an RFA
induces a one-time increase in the rate of targeted subjects in applications and awards by
roughly 8-10%, but only for the basic science grants. Examining the commercial science
grants, Figure 7 identifies no significant increase in the rate at which targeted subjects are
either pursued in all applications, or successful awards.
Given the evidence for an effect amongst the basic science grants specifically, Figure 8
presents the results for the publication outcomes associated with these grants. The coef-
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Figure 8: RFA Treatment Effects, Subsequent Publications from Basic Science Awards

N ote: Results from estimating Equation 2.5 with full set of fixed effects only using the basic science grants
(R01, R21); zero indicating the scientific subject’s mean rate of occurrence in publications generated by
applications funded each round, conditional on time trends across all subjects. 95% confidence intervals
for each outcome in dashed lines and respective colors. Application rounds are approximately four months.
“Raw” measures publications as the count of publications in top-500 biomedical journals per Journal Impact
Factor (JIF) mentioning the targeted subject. “JIF-wgt.” publications are multiplied by the journal’s JIF.
Grant types described in text.

ficients indicate that the number of subsequent publications mentioning the targeted subjects increases by approximately 5%, using both the unadjusted and Journal-Impact-Factor
weighted publication counts. Interestingly, there is also an increase in publication outcomes
for grants awarded the round after the RFA, roughly 2%. This is somewhat counterintuitive
when combined with the fact that no new grants appear to be awarded during this period
(See Figure 7). How might these “spillovers” arise? Discussions with NIH staff suggest that
this pattern is in line with scientists holding off from assigning publications to a prior grant
in expectation of success in the RFA, failing to win a grant in the RFA, and then assigning
those publications to a grant obtained in the following round. Examining this substitution
of publications across grants is beyond the scope of this Chapter, and the magnitude does
not appear to be a first-order concern for my subsequent productivity analyses.
Of note, publication outcomes based on the raw count of articles in any top-500 biomedical
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journal, versus quality-adjusted counts both reveal a very similar treatment effect. Had the
new science been of much lower ex-post quality, I should have identified larger effects for
the raw count measure relative to the quality-adjusted measure. Section 2.5 explores this
measure of productivity - publications per applications - in more detail.
Does Political Capital Bias the Effects?
The previous results support the main assumption that these contests do not occur during
significant, but unobservable, shocks to their value that would otherwise bias my estimates.
These results were based on subjects that had not been specifically referenced by Congress
in appropriation bills, my proxy for political capital and an indicator of subjects being “at
risk” of experiencing an unobservable shock from my perspective. By comparing the pattern
of effects for scientific subjects with and without political capital, I can test the extent to
which this proxy may capture the outcomes of such selection, should it occur. Figure 9 plots
the main effects, estimated only for awards through the basic science subset of grants, for
treated subjects with and without political capital. In both cases, I still include the full set
of untreated subjects as the control groups.
The treatment effects for subjects with political capital reveals two important findings. First,
there is a significant pre-existing trend for treated subjects at time t = −3 where the rate of
science is roughly 6% above average. Second, despite this pre-existing trends, the magnitudes
of the main treatment effects at t = 0 are statistically equivalent. This result suggests that
at least within the set of treated subjects, the bias of selecting on political capital shocks
(per my proxy) is not significant. Examining the mean effects over time, the pattern for
political subjects indicates there may be substitution away from future application rounds
to the RFA - βt+2 = 3.1 (N.S.). While not statistically significant, this “hurrying” effect is
visually apparent when examining the dynamic treatment effect, suggesting that scientists
may rush their applications to the RFA, and the density of applications is such that these
gaps in are not replaced.
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Figure 9: RFA Treatment Effects, Role of Political Capital

N ote: βb coefficients from estimating Equation 2.5 with full set of fixed effects for basic science grants; zero
indicating the scientific subject’s mean rate of occurrence in successful applications each round, conditional
on time trends across all subjects. Application rounds are approximately four months. “Political Subjects”
are identified by their occurrence in Congressional appropriation bills for the NIH during 2008-2013.

Heterogeneity Across Science and Scientists
Table 4 explores predictions related to the types of science and scientists that might be most
responsive to RFAs. First, in columns (1) and (2) I calculate the rate of science for “New”
and experienced investigators separately. Although it was suggested that the inexperienced
scientists would be the most responsive to RFAs, the raw data indicated a much lower level
of participation relative to the investigator-initiated contests. As the two columns indicate,
these scientists do appear to be more responsive to RFAs with an estimated effect for both
outcomes (applications and awards) roughly twice the size of the estimates observed for
experienced investigators.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 test the prediction that for subjects which it is inherently
harder to get funded in the traditional open contests - as indicated by a lower success rate
prior to the RFA - we should see larger effects. In line with this prediction, column (3)
indicates that subjects with success rates below the 25th percentile are significantly more
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Table 4: Heterogenous Effects Across Scientists and Subjects
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

0.145***
(0.0198)

0.074***
(0.0076)

0.077***
(0.0061)

0.079***
(0.0066)

0.081***
(0.0066)

0.061**
(0.0289)

0.109***
(0.0112)

0.107**
(0.0498)

0.139***
(0.0196)

Broad
Subjects
27,322

Specific
Subjects
481,194

Panel A: Apps.
RFA

RFA ×
Win% ≤ 25th p.

0.265***
(0.0367)

RFA ×
Win% ≥ 75th p.

0.022
(0.0152)

RFA ×
MeSHP ost0 99

0.008
(0.0162)

Panel B: Awards
RFA

0.286***
(0.0291)

0.161***
(0.0162)

RFA ×
Win% ≤ 25th p.

0.110***
(0.0109)

0.120***
(0.0122)

0.409***
(0.0641)

RFA ×
Win% ≥ 75th p.

-0.004
(0.0264)

RFA ×
MeSHP ost0 99
Sample
Obs.

0.106***
(0.0119)

0.059**
(0.0276)
New
Invest.
723,125

Exper.
Invest.
1,012,225

Full

Full

Full

1,060,600

1,060,600

1,060,600

N ote: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the subject level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
New Investigators are scientists yet to have received a research project grant award from the NIH, all
scientists are otherwise Experienced. All dependent variables are binary indicators. Win% ≤ 25th p. = 1
indicates that in the time prior to the RFA the subject’s mean rate of success in the open contests was
below the 25th percentile, and likewise for Win% ≥ 75th p. MeSHP ost0 99 is an indicator variable set to 1
if the subject was added to the MeSH hierarchy after 1999. Broad and Specific subjects are made clear
in Figure 3.

responsive to RFAs. In fact, the effect for this subset is roughly 3-4 times larger than the
mean effect estimated for the full distribution of treated subjects. This indicates the value
of restricted competitions for “difficult-to-fund” subjects, where scientists pursuing these
subjects do not have to compete with “easy-to-fund” alternatives. Conversely, the mean
effect for subjects in the upper quartile of success rates prior to RFA treatment are equally
responsive as the average subject with respect to changes in applications and awards.
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Column (5) of Table 4 examines heterogeneity in effects for “old” and “new” science. Here,
I define new science as MeSH subjects who were added to the vocabulary post-199933 .
The motivating theory for this analyses was ambiguous. The results show no differential
treatment effect across these two types of science for total applications, but there does appear
to be a significantly larger increase in successful applications when the science targeted is
relatively new. This indicates that while new science is equally responsive in terms of
inducing new applications, these new applications are more likely to be funded, suggesting
they are of greater ex-ante quality.
The presence of redirection costs also suggested that there should be smaller effects when
requesting “broad” subjects given the larger magnitudes of redirection necessary for scientists
to pursue new broad topics. Columns (6) and (7) of Table 4 provide estimates for broad and
specific subjects, respectively. The estimated coefficients support the theoretical predictions
with the specific subjects seeing larger relative increases in their rate of usage in both total
and successful applications.
Substitutions and Spillovers
Four avenues of substitution or spillovers are possible in this setting: over the targeted (RFA)
and open (investigator-initiated) contests at time of treatment; over time from future open
contests; over grant types (i.e. R01, R41, etc.); and over science. Although the main
effects are positive, it is possible that some of the applications to these RFAs were scientists
substituting the RFA contest for the open contest. Conversely, it is possible that the shocks
associated with RFAs may incentivize scientists to pursue a targeted subject in the open
contests34 . Figure 10 re-estimates Equation 2.5, but only including applications to the
investigator-initiated open contests.
33
In 1999 there was a large restructuring of the MeSH hierarchy that included significantly more (5 times)
than the annual average of new term additions. This cutoff prevents these mechanical additions from being
labeled as “new”; robustness tests where the delineating year is made more recent are qualitatively similar.
34
Scientists may observe the RFA, anticipate a “gap” in competition it would create in the open contest
and pursue this opportunity. Or, information shocks associated with the targeted subjects may also spur
pursuits.
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Figure 10: Substitution or Spillovers from Investigator-Initiated Contest

N ote: Results from estimating Equation 2.5 with full set of fixed effects using applications only from the
investigator-initiated “open” contests at the NIH; zero indicating the scientific subject’s mean rate of occurrence in applications submitted each round, conditional on time trends across all subjects. Application
rounds are approximately four months. Compare to Figure 7, which plots these estimates using all applications to the NIH (i.e. “open” and RFA contests).

For the basic science grants, there is no evidence that any of the successful applications are
a result of scientists substituting away from the open contest during or after the RFAs. For
the commercial science grants, there is a significant decline in applications referencing the
targeted subjects during the round of the RFA, as well as three application rounds post-RFA.
These declines are not statistically significant amongst successful applications; however, a
decline in targeted subject occurrences during the RFA-round is qualitatively apparent in
the pattern of main effects.
The two other potential types of substitution or spillovers possible in this setting are across
grants and subjects. To the first, it is possible that when requesting research on a subject
using a certain grant type (e.g. R01), that scientists simply substitute away from proposing
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Table 5: Substitution or Spillovers Across Grant Types and Peer Subjects

RFA: other
grant types,
same subject
RFA: peer
subjects
Unit
Obs.

(1)
Apps.
-0.000262
((0.00688)

Subject
1,238,000

(2)
Awards
0.0121
(0.0135)

Subject
970,300

(3)
Apps.

(4)
Awards

0.0415***
(0.00590)
Peers
142,550

0.0538***
(0.0108)
Peers
129,425

N ote: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the subject level.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. For the columns (1) and (2),
subject units are the same unit of analyses as all other estimations
and the treatment is whether or not the subject was requested in an
RFA using a different grant type than the focal panel. For example,
if “Diabetes mellitus, type 1” is requested in an RFA for R01 grants,
then this variable equals 1 for the panels of “Diabetes mellitus, type
1” with all other grant types. For columns (3) and (4) peer units
are groupings of subjects that share the same superior subject in the
MeSH hierarchy with a treated subject (See Figure 3), but are not
treated themselves. The rates of the treated subject are excluded
from this measure and the panels are collapsed to the level of peer
groupings, hence the change in observations.

the requested subject in other grant types. Table 5 columns (1) and (2) test for this effect
by estimating the rate of science in subject-grant pairs that are not requested in an RFA as
a pair, but the subject is requested in another grant type. Neither coefficient is significantly
different from zero, implying such substitution does not occur on a meaningful level.
Looking across subjects it is possible that when responding to these contests scientists are
substituting away from similar subjects not requested in the RFA. On the other hand, it
is also possible that these similar subjects might see an increase themselves because (a)
practically speaking, the method through which I identify subjects as being treated may
not perfectly capture the full set of subjects eligible for the RFA35 , or (b) the information
shocks associated with these contests might induce scientists to consider subjects similar,
but not explicitly requested. In order to test for these effects, I remove treated panels from
the dataset and collapse the subjects based on their peer groupings (see Figure 3) while
35
My methodology requires the subject explicitly appears in the text of the RFA. Whereas it may be that
a range of subjects is requested, and my method only identifies the boundaries of that range.
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noting the timing of the removed panel’s RFA treatment. Thus, I can test for changes in the
total rate of science for these subjects most proximate to the treated subject at times when
the RFAs occur. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 indicate that the spillover forces dominate
any amount of substitution at this level of subject groupings. Specifically, treating a subject
with an RFA is associated with a 4-5% increase in the total rate of science for the peers of
these treated subjects. It is still possible that scientists are substituting away from areas
less proximate to the treated subjects; however, beyond this test of peers it is very difficult
to a priori identify where these substitutions may come from.

2.5. Productivity: Science and Scientist
2.5.1. Science-Level Results
The main results indicate that RFA treatment is associated with an increase in the occurrence of targeted subjects in publications resulting from basic science (i.e. R01, R21)
NIH awards. In order to more specifically explore the connection between new awards and
their resulting publications - productivity - I estimate the rate of subject s occurrences in
publications from grant types j at time t as the following linear equation:

Pubssjt = α + β × Awardssjt + γsj + τt + sjt

(2.6)

where γsj and τt are the same fixed effects from the main specification, and Awardssjt is
the rate of subject occurrence in successful applications. I examine both unadjusted and
quality-adjusted (per Journal Impact Factor) publication measures (Pubssjt ). Note that
this is not investigating productivity at the level of project, but rather within projects at
the level of science. Formally, β indicates the number of publications on a subject for every
awarded project that is related to that subject. I first estimate the model using OLS, in order
to identify the marginal productivity of endogenously submitted NIH applications. I then
estimate the model using the RFA treatment as a binary instrumental variable in order to
identify the marginal productivity of science induced by these targeted contests. I estimate
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linear models in order to simplify interpretation, and because we are mainly concerned with
the relative difference between the OLS and IV estimates of β, and not the magnitudes.
Table 6: Productivity of Awarded Applications: Endogenous vs. RFA-Induced

Awards

Pub. Count, Top-500 Journal
(1)
(2)
(3)
1.341***
2.742***
(0.0370)
(0.420)

Pub. Count, JIF-Weighted
(4)
(5)
(6)
13.51***
28.31***
(0.359)
(4.316)

1.882***
(0.300)
1,483,825
OLS
Y

19.43***
(3.097)
1,483,825
OLS
Y

RFA
Observations
Spec.
FE

1,483,825
OLS
Y

1,483,825
IV
Y

1,483,825
OLS
Y

1,483,825
IV
Y

N ote: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the subject level. * p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Estimated using Equation 2.6 Outcomes are the number
of publications mentioning a subject, restricting the sample of publications to only
include those in a journal ranked in the top 500 per Journal Impact Factor (JIF),
or weighting all publications by the JIF. The set of Fixed Effects (FE) included are
subject by grant-type pairs, and application round. Columns (1) and (4) present
endogenous mentioning publications per mentioning award; Columns (2) and (5)
present the reduced form treatment effect of a subject being requested in an RFA;
and Columns (3) and (6) present the 2SLS estimate using RFA treatment as an
instrumental variable for the number of mentioning awards.

Table 6 presents the results of these OLS and IV estimates, along with the reduced form
estimates of the RFA treatment effect on publications36 . Relative to the marginal occurrence
of subjects submitted to the default NIH contest, the IV estimates indicate that when
induced via RFA, the marginal science is roughly twice as productive in terms of publication
outcomes, even when adjusting for publication quality.
2.5.2. Scientist-Level Results
The magnitude of difference between the IV and OLS estimates in the previous section could
be driven by two factors: (1), the new projects induced by RFAs are more productive at
the project-level, that is, more publications per project, or (2) the marginal appearance of
subjects in new applications submitted to RFAs are most indicative of the ultimate direction
of a proposal, that is, more science per project.
36

This amounts to a linear specification Equation 2.5.
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In order to disentangle these forces, I exploit a discontinuity in win probability to identify
causal estimates of project-level production in both RFA and Open projects. This approach
circumvents the fact that the awarding of grants to projects at the NIH is not random in
general.
I begin by supplementing my data with all publications for each scientist, using the Authority database, regardless of whether the publication cites an NIH grant. My empirical approach extends the “simulated threshold” identification strategy of Jacob and Lefgren (2011),
and relies on the fact that randomness arises due to differences in quality rank (absolute
merit) and funding order ranks (relative merit) in the NIH budgeting process (See Azoulay
et al. (2015c) for further discussion). This is empirically useful since (1) the simulated
thresholds vary over absolute quality scores, so it is less likely to be biased by any unique discontinuities in the quality distribution; (2) these thresholds do not actually exist in practice
and are not public information, so they are less subject to traditional concerns for endogenous selection around the thresholds; and (3) the LATE estimated using these thresholds in
an instrumental variables framework identifies the treatment effect for precisely the projects
that would be affected by reallocation decisions at the NIH.
Figure 11: Win Probability Discontinuities
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Table 7: Simulated Threshold Construction
Quality Score
100
99
98
97
96
95
94
93
92
91
90
89
88

Quality Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Win
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Above Threshold
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y

Table 7 displays how the simulated thresholds are generated. Figure 11 demonstrates the
discontinuities in win probability across the thresholds for both RFA and Open contests.
Within 0.5 s.d. of the thresholds, the win difference is roughly 23 p.p. (33%) in the Open
contests and 47 p.p. (110%) in the RFA contests. Figure 12 plots the density of applications for both contests and shows no evidence of “bunching” or discontinuities around the
thresholds, that might have been suggestive of endogenous selection issues.
Figure 12: Distribution of Application Grades

The estimating equations for this fuzzy regression discontinuity approach are as follows:
for scientist i submitting application a to contest k at time t, their publication production
post-application (win or not) is
Pubs Postiakt = βw Winiakt + g(Gradeiakt )
+ Xiakt βx + κk + τt + µiakt ,
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(2.7)

where I utilize the simulated threshold (T) to instrument Winiakt per
Winiakt = γ1 Above Tiakt + γ2 (Above Tiakt × Gradeiakt )

(2.8)

+ g(Gradeiakt ) + Xiakt βx + κk + τt + µiakt
where, Above Tiakt = 1 if Gradeiakt > T and γ2 permits a discontinuous effect of Grade on
Pr(Win) at the threshold. The key assumption of this approach is that conditional on the
controls, an application’s position, per its grade, relative to the threshold is uncorrelated
with expectations about the publication outcomes of that project.
Table 8 indicates that on average, the receipt of an average-sized NIH grant leads the
scientist to publish 0.3 or 0.6 additional publications in the following years for Open and
RFA grants, respectively. This discrepancy between Open and RFA grants is not driven by
differences in the size of the grants awarded, since these estimates combined with sample
averages suggest that the marginal publication costs the NIH approximately $4.1 million
when awarded through Open contests compared to only $2.1 million in the RFA contests.
Table 8: IV Results: Project-Level Production
IV Full Sample
Open
RFA
0.323*** 0.707***
(0.061)
(0.13)

IV 0.5 Bandwidth
Open
RFA
0.312*** 0.572***
(0.11)
(0.17)

Prior Pubsit

0.074***
(0.0027)

0.096***
(0.0047)

0.077***
(0.0032)

0.096***
(0.0057)

N
k , t FE; X;
g(Grade)

25,331
Y

10,214
Y

18,814
Y

6,932
Y

Avg. $ / Pub
Avg. $ / %Pub

$3.91M
$126K

$1.72M
$82K

$4.06M
$135K

$2.13M
$105K

Winikt

N ote: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the contest level per estimating
Equations 2.7 and 2.8 jointly in 2SLS. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Avg. $
/ Pub and Avg. $ / %Pub are predicted using the coefficients on Winikt and the
sample averages for amounts awarded and publication rates.

Returning to the science-level I.V. estimates of the previous section, these project-level
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estimates can plausibly explain the entire gap in science-level production identified. That
is to say, it appears that RFA-induced projects generate equal amounts of new science per
publication, but are responsible for approximately twice as many publications (per dollar).
So long as the science targeted within these contests are at least half-as valuable as untargeted science, these suggest indicate that RFAs are likely welfare-increasing.

2.6. Discussion
Given the features of a highly specialized workforce, it is not clear a priori that the grant
competitions I study should induce any new research; scientists have strong preferences, face
large fixed costs and are constrained in their ability to pursue topics less scientifically similar
to their prior work.
This Chapter explores the responsiveness of scientists to the NIH’s attempts to overcome
these constraints and induce new research with targeted grant competitions - RFAs. I use
data on all applications to the Institutes for eight years along with two novel text algorithms
in order to create two complementary datasets on the rate of science and the redirection
of scientists. Using difference-in-difference research designs I find that RFAs can induce
and fund new science, but only amongst those soliciting basic science. RFAs utilizing small
business research grants intended to fund applied research appear to fund science that would
have been successful otherwise. A study of these small business grants at the Department
of Energy concluded that such subsidies can have large positive impacts on the growth of
emergent firms (Howell 2015); however, these results highlight the difficulties of determining
precisely which types of firms should experience these gains.
Amongst the basic science grants, important sources of heterogeneity are apparent across
different types of science and scientists. In line with a selection model, science with the
lowest success rates prior to the RFA and scientists who have yet to receive an NIH research
project grant are the most responsive. By restricting the scope of competition, the RFAs
provide a more valuable avenue to pursue grant funds for these types. I also find that
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“specific” subjects (lower in the hierarchy) are more responsive than “broad” subjects. This
is consistent with the presence of constraints on scientists’ ability to redirect their research
trajectories, since moving from one specific subject to another requires smaller levels of
adjustment.
Examining the productivity of the new basic research awards indicates that the science
induced via RFAs is about twice as productive in terms of publication output per science
awarded. Interestingly, this appears to be driven by a growth in the amount of science
published per science proposed, and not the funding of projects that are any more productive
in terms of science published per dollar. Thus, while the RFA awards are roughly 20%
larger in dollar amounts, the redirection of science-level productivity without any change to
project-level productivity suggests these larger investments are worthwhile from the NIH’s
perspective.
One phenomenon I do not investigate, that is certainly applicable to many scientists outside
the NIH, is the choice of project partners. While the majority of proposals submitted to
the NIH are done so by a single primary investigator (PI), roughly 14% are submitted by
two or more co-primary investigators. Interestingly, the rate of co-PIs is almost twice as
large within the RFAs investigated in this study. Thus, this may also be a useful setting to
explore the determinants and outcomes of collaboration in scientific endeavors37 .

37

See Catalini (2015) for a review of the literature on collaboration in science and the impact of randomly
assigned neighbors - in the geographic sense.
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CHAPTER 3 : The Elasticity of the Direction of Science
3.1. Introduction
A fundamental duty of the manager is to determine the allocation of resources across people
and projects - the direction of work. But when the optimal direction is uncertain, information
asymmetries can dictate that managers relinquish some control to their workers (Aghion and
Tirole 1997; Dessein 2002). In the case of science - the production of new knowledge - this
agency-information tradeoff is especially relevant (Aghion et al. 2008; Lacetera 2009), and
managers often balance this tradeoff through processes that resemble contests1 : resources
are allocated to specific topics (allowing the manager to express preferences), while scientists
are permitted to self-select pursuits (leveraging their private information). In these cases,
resources are both inputs and “pull” incentives that must be valued enough to overcome
the costs of changing directions given the high degree of specialization that characterize
scientists (e.g. Jones 2009). This Chapter provides evidence to the cumulative magnitude
of these scientific adjustment costs by asking: to what extent do scientists require more
resources in order to change their research trajectories some amount? In other words, what
is the elasticity of the direction of science?
The search for new directions has long been viewed as central to growth across markets
(Schumpeter 1934), organizations (Nelson and Winter 1982), and individuals (Fleming and
Sorenson 2001). And prior work has identified a number of forces that influence scientists’
choices of direction including their preferences (Stern 2004), social interactions (Stuart and
Ding 2006), incentive structures (Azoulay et al. 2011; Sauermann and Cohen 2010), and
supportive institutions (Furman and Stern 2011), in addition to highlighting how cognitive
constraints can impede optimal search (Levinthal 1997; Boudreau et al. 2016a). However,
1

A contest (or tournament) simply defined here by entrants incurring sunk costs in exchange for a reward
(e.g. Tullock 1980). Although not explicitly labeled as such, internal competitions for resources are a chief
component of many organizations’ allocation procedures as highlighted by Bower (1970), Williamson (1975),
and Stein (1997). And to be clear, the focus here is on the use of contests as sorting mechanisms, as opposed
to the effort incentives made possible via contests as compared to traditional piece-rate wages highlighted
by Lazear and Rosen (1981), Wright (1983) and Moldovanu and Sela (2001), among others.
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there is no causal evidence to date on the total costs of incentivizing new directions as a
function of the magnitude of the change in direction, likely due to the empirical demands of
identifying this relationship.
In order to estimate the elasticity of direction, this Chapter examines the choices of academic
biomedical scientists in response to a series of targeted grant contests at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), a setting both empirically useful and policy relevant. Administrative
data and a novel text algorithm allow me to observe a large number of individuals (∼100K
scientists), consider a large number of new opportunities (∼700 targeted contests) with well
defined payoffs (grant dollar amounts) and, importantly, measure the “scientific similarity” 2
between two abstracts (e.g. a prior publication and a new grant proposal), and thereby a
change in direction. Furthermore, the NIH has increasingly become an active manager of
the biomedical workforce, and much like many public and private organizations that utilize
similar mechanisms to manage high-skilled workers, their optimal research policy will depend critically on how responsive - i.e. elastic - their workforce is. As the costs of redirection
grow, so to does the lower bound at which managerial intervention is worthwhile.
I begin by framing this parameter as a compensating differential; essentially, what is the expected value of a grant competition such that a scientist is indifferent between it and a given
level of redirection? Ideally, to identify this differential, an experiment would be conducted
where individuals must choose their next project from a random menu of redirection-reward
pairs. However, such a research design is practically infeasible amongst this sample, given
the large costs of biomedical research. Instead, my analysis utilizes the fact that scientists
seeking funding from the NIH can either (1) submit a proposal of any scientific project
to the default “open” contests that are continuously available and accept proposals of any
type, or (2) undertake some redirection and submit a specific proposal to one of the “tar2

This concept has also been labeled “intellectual distance” (Boudreau et al. 2016a) with distance being
the inverse of similarity, and “technical marginality” (Jeppesen and Lakhani 2010) where an individual’s
marginality refers to how similar their technical skills are to the focal area. My choice of terminology stems
from the fact that the algorithm used to quantify this concept is based on estimating the similarity in
scientific word usage between two pieces of text.
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geted” contests. Here, instead of random menu of redirection-reward choices, scientists face
a random menu of redirection-contest choices3 . The research design is then based on the
following assumption: if scientists can costlessly adjust the trajectories of their research then
both types of contests, open and targeted, should see competition to the point that their
expected values are equivalent. Otherwise, if the (measurable) redirections necessitated by
the targeted contests are costly, then any wedge in (unconditional) payoffs between the two
contests can be related to the average amount of redirection the targeted contests require4 .
I use a simple choice model to inform a difference-in-difference estimation that separates
this differential from other sources of variation in the data. More specifically, I examine
redirection within the two main grant types that embody the explore-exploit tradeoff of
R&D in order to condition out fixed features of these targeted contests. To account for
potential selection or unobservable variables biases, I control for the grant proposal review
score, the key (typically unobserved) determinant of funding outcomes, and also include
specifications with scientist-fixed effects. Conditional on the decision to apply to the NIH
for funding at all, I find that scientists are indifferent between a 1.6 s.d. (≈$1.7M) increase
in the expected value of a grant competition and a 1 s.d. decrease in the scientific similarity pursuing new directions - needed to compete for that payoff (elasticity ≈ 0.6). Importantly, I
find that this differential is driven entirely by scientists “experienced” with the NIH, evidence
that older, more successful scientists are less willing to adjust the trajectories of their work.
Notably, these first estimates of the elasticity of direction condition on the decision to
seek funding from the NIH, and are therefore likely an upper bound of population mean
elasticity5 . To identify estimates that are not conditioned on the apply-or-not decision,
I conduct a second analysis that examines entry into the targeted contests by creating a
3
In Section 3.2 I discuss how these targeted contests are generated by NIH staff, and in refer to earlier
work on this project that does not suggest NIH management is selecting on unobservable factors that would
significantly bias this approach.
4
This is approach has been used in the industrial organization literature where one could infer differences
in the fixed costs of entry between two industries if, holding all else constant, the profit margins were not
equal.
5
Still, the first estimates are policy relevant given the large number of applications received annually.
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dataset of scientist-contest pairs and utilize the methods developed in Bajari et al. (2010)
to account for endogenous competitive effects. I identify an elasticity of 0.25, which, when
combined with the first set of estimates, suggests substantial variation in this parameter
both across and within individuals over time.
Estimates of these kind are necessary for any model of input allocation where the supply
of workers is fixed (at least in the short run) and control over direction is delegated to the
workers to some degree6 . And while contests like these used by the NIH have been proposed
as useful “low-powered incentives” through which managers can delegate only a portion of
authority (Aghion et al. 2008), understanding the magnitude of directional adjustment costs
is necessary to ensure these incentives are not too low-powered.
This Chapter connects the literatures on scientific choice (discussed above) and “inducement
contests”, whereby managers solicit specific types of innovations with targeted rewards7 .
A growing empirical literature has found strong support for theoretical predictions about
behaviors within contests (i.e. Boudreau et al. 2011; Boudreau et al. 2016b) by leveraging
exogenous variation in the assignment of individuals to certain contests. This Chapter is a
valuable complement to this work as it is precisely this selection issue - how do individuals
choose to enter contests - that the NIH setting allows me to study.
The Chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 describes the NIH setting and data; Section 3.3
contains the compensating differential approach and results; Section 3.4 contains the entry
model approach and results; and Section 3.5 highlights the implications of these findings.
6

Solving the efficient allocation of R&D funds amidst these sorts of adjustment costs is beyond the scope
of this Chapter. But see, for examples in the biomedical setting, Lichtenberg (2001), while noting that
adjustment costs when re-allocating funds are not considered.
7
See Williams (2012) for a review of the state of science.
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3.2. Setting and Data
3.2.1. Open and Targeted Funding Opportunities at the NIH
Broadly speaking, the NIH’s chief objective is to award roughly $25 billion annually in
research grants to extramural scientists based at universities, medical centers and other research institutions. While the NIH has long been the largest funder of biomedical research in
the world, it has become increasingly involved in determining how these funds are allocated.
The key mechanism through which the NIH attempts to steer these funds, and thus the
direction of science, is Requests For Applications (RFAs). But before detailing RFAs, it is
useful to understand the traditional investigator-initiated, or what I will refer to as “open”,
grant contests.
Essentially, the open contests comprise of a large set of channels through which a grant
application is funneled for scientific review and then rank-ordered to determine funding
priority8 . Following Azoulay et al. (2015c), it is useful to think of the NIH application
process as consisting of three levels of competition: Disease, Science and Time (D-S-T).
Applications receive their review scores from one of roughly 200 review panels organized
around scientific disciplines (Science), but then compete for funding with those scores at
the Institute (e.g. National Cancer Institute) it was submitted to (Disease), with total
allocations depending on Congressionally-determined Institute-level budgets each fiscal year
(Time). Thus, each application to the open contests can be characterized by a unique
Science-Time pair where it receives it’s review score and a unique Disease-Time pair where
it competes for funding with that score, against applications from other-Science same-Time
channels.
Importantly, there are no explicit restrictions on the types of science that may be submitted
to the open contests. In other words, the review process is almost entirely aimed at identifying the vertical quality of a given application, so long as it fits within the broad objectives
8

This is an approximation of the official funding process, which are outlined here: https://goo.gl/blLuuU.
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of the NIH9 .
To contrast, in an RFA, funds from one or more NIH Institutes are set aside for a single grant
competition related to the predefined area of science10 . The RFAs are typically announced
four to eight months prior to the deadline for submissions and applications are evaluated by
a single peer-review panel. Using the D-S-T terminology, RFAs consist of a single DiseaseScience-Time contest, where entrants face 28.6 (s.d.=38.2) competitors on average.
Table 9: RFA-Open Levels Comparison
Occurrence
Open
Institute-Level
RFA

Ongoing
Na = 24
One-time
6-8 month window
Na ≈ 24

Size/Scope
Competition
85 new awards
$110M
50 science panels
7 new awards
$11M
1 science panel

Outcomes
Win Rate: 15%
Avg. size: $1.3M
Win Rate: 19%
Avg. size: $1.6M

a

N is the number of active, unique contests available each 4-month application round. For the open contests, this set of 24 is fixed over the
sample period. For the RFAs, roughly 10 new contests are announced
each application round.

Table 9 summarizes the differences in the scale and scope of the open and RFA mechanisms, proxying for the scientific “scope” of each with the number of unique scientific review
panels involved and describing “size” per the total amount of research funds available for
disbursement. On average, an open competition is roughly 10 times larger than RFAs in
terms of the funds to be awarded. However, the narrower range of science eligible within the
RFAs creates a contest with a larger scope-per-scale ratio - twice as many dollars per review
panel. Conversations with multiple NIH applicants confirm that these marked differences
in the features of the RFA and open contests are of first-order concern to them, suggesting
that any empirical analysis should take them into account.
9

“The NIH’s mission is to uncover new knowledge that will lead to better health for everyone. Simply
described, the goal of NIH research is to acquire new knowledge to help prevent, detect, diagnose, and treat
disease and disability.”
10
The NIH also releases “Program Announcements” where certain types of science is solicited; however,
these calls are not accompanied by set-aside funds made specifically available for competition and in practice
vary widely in their format. I focus my analyses on RFAs because of their well-defined properties as funding
mechanisms.
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Given the smaller and well-defined level of competition unique to the RFAs, it is reasonable
to assume that applicants to these contests may have different information as to their chances
of funding, a factor I explicitly incorporate into the choice model of Section 3.3. However
given the wedge in expected value between the two contest types described above, it is not
clear if this information is valuable to scientists considering an application. If, for example,
this information reduced the uncertainty of competing in the targeted contests, then risk
averse individuals would place a greater value on them, be more likely to enter compared
to open and success rates should be lower on average given the larger awards. Although
Table 9 presents summary statistics, the fact that the difference in levels is the opposite
suggests this may not be a large effect or countervailing forces lower the expected value of
these targeted contests.
Section 3.3 discusses relevant details about the allocation of funds within these contests as
it related to the empirical design.
3.2.2. Grant Types
I focus my empirical analyses on the two most common research grant types awarded, the
R01 and the R21. These two types capture alternate ends of the exploit-explore continuum
commonly investigated in studies of R&D strategy. The larger R01 grants are intended to
support full-scale research projects that have preliminary results and build on the scientists’
current base of knowledge (exploit). The smaller R21 grants are intended to develop new
lines of research and do not require any preliminary results (explore). The average total
lifetime award sizes for R01s and R21s, are $1.3 million and $375,000, respectively.
3.2.3. RFA Generation and Relevant NIH Policies
Because my empirical approaches below will not perfectly control for the entirety of underlying differences and trends in the supply and demand of science, it is important to
clarify how RFAs are generated and the extent to which these motivations may influence
the empirical results. One should be concerned that if, for example, RFAs were created to
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target especially promising areas of biomedical research, then it would not be clear to what
extent scientists are responding to the grant incentives versus these unobservable changes
in the demand for the targeted science. However, in related work on this setting, I evaluate the causal effect of RFAs on science-level outcomes (e.g. what happens to the rate of
research on disease A or organism B when targeted in an RFA), and reports no statistical
evidence for a significant selection bias, even amongst those scientific topics most likely to
be selected on unobservable features. This is largely due to the fact that the preferences
of NIH staff responsible for the development of RFAs largely revolve around maintaining
equality in their distribution of research funding. This strong preference in turn leads to
the creation of most RFAs for “underserved” areas of science per the NIH’s preferences, not
potential applications. Intuitively, these areas of science are underserved because either the
supply of knowledge or demand for advances in those fields, as interpreted by the scientists
themselves, are too low to warrant pursuit. Thus, throughout the analyses I will maintain
the assumption that the features of these contests are orthogonal to unobservable features
of the science and scientists targeted.
An important policy surrounding RFAs is that scientists are permitted to resubmit unsuccessful RFA applications to the open grant competitions, unlike original submissions to the
open contests. This provides yet another useful feature of the RFAs that, in addition to the
narrow scope of science highlighted before, motivate an empirical design that can account
for the fixed value of these particular grant contests.
One other policy relevant for my analyses is the NIH’s New Investigator program11 . In
order to prevent grant funds from being concentrated among older experienced investigators
where there are potentially less efficient (Levin and Stephan 1991; Freeman and Van Reenen
2009), the NIH explicitly labels individuals who have yet to successfully compete for a research grant as New Investigators. When making funding decisions (after peer review) for
open applications, these proposals are typically evaluated separately in order to maintain
11

See https://goo.gl/Ynd0W3 for the specific details of this program.
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comparable success rates among New and experienced investigators. However, this policy
does not hold in the targeted contest. While the theory of scientific choice described below will suggest that these younger, less experienced scientists may face lower costs when
adjusting the trajectory of their work and hence be more likely to compete in the targeted
contests, the lack of this feature may also prove a significant barrier. The raw data suggests
this preference for New Investigators in the open contests is valuable: only 14% of RFA
applications are from New Investigators, compared to 24% in the open contests.
3.2.4. NIH Data Sources
Data on all grant applications to the NIH from 2002 to 2011 were collected from the NIH’s
confidential administrative database. The full data contains the following: application identifier, review score; funding decision; Institute (for Disease); review section (for Science);
and fiscal year (for Time). Because the NIH’s protocol for review scores changed in the
middle of my sample period, I construct a new “grade” for each application based on the
standardized distributions of review scores before and after the protocol change. The grade
variable ranges from 0 to 1 and indicates the percent of all applications with lower review
scores. For applications submitted on or after 2006, the data also contains the abstract and
title of the proposed research for both funded and non-funded applications.
For the compensating differential analysis, data on all RFA and open applications for R01 or
R21 grants between 2006 and 2011 were compiled. This dataset contains 122,333 applications
from 72,421 unique scientists to either a standing open contest or one of 727 unique RFAs
hosted during this timeframe.
For the entry analysis, data was collected for 247 of the RFA announcements between 2002
and 2009 soliciting some combination of R01 and/or R21 research grants. Details on the
timing, administration, research objectives and funds allocated were scraped from the NIH
announcement website12 .
12

Available at https://goo.gl/LuaBOQ
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Each scientist’s full publication history (including non-NIH-funded work) were constructed
using the disambiguated version of the PubMed scientific article database developed by
Torvik and Smalheiser (2009). To address the notorious difficulties of accurately matching
publications to scientists given the lack of standardized identifiers in this data, the authors
developed a maximum likelihood based agglomerative algorithm for computing clusters of
articles that belong to the same inferred author. Thus, I am confident in the fidelity of my
data, which is essential for the algorithm described below.
3.2.5. Scientific Similarity: pmra Algorithm
Fundamental to the notion of redirecting scientists is “how much” their course of work is adjusted. The task of moving a scientist from working on topic A to topic B will depend largely
on the scientific similarity between A and B. Do they make use of the same knowledge?
Do experiments use the same inputs such as chemicals or organisms? Can the scientists’
laboratory equipment perform the necessary tests? Scholars have long pondered the costs
and benefits of of scientists operating in a new field “outside” their prior specialty. But
measurement issues have limited empirical analyses for some time (Gieryn and Hirsh 1983),
and data availability has limited studying the choice to enter new scientific fields before
outcomes are known - precisely the focus of this Chapter.
Formally, I define scientific similarity as the overlap in scientific terminology between two sets
of information, here, abstracts of publications, grant applications and/or contest objectives.
Intuitively, if two abstracts describing research projects both use the same scientific terms,
especially if those terms are rare in general, it is likely the underlying science is more similar.
Estimating the similarity between bodies of text has been a longstanding focus in the field
bioinformatics where researchers have devised a number of methods to establish relationships
between text pairs. The most widely used similarity estimation algorithm is the PubMed
related articles (pmra) algorithm, developed by Lin and Wilbur (2007) at the NLM. pmra
is currently employed by the NLM as the algorithm underlying the “Similar articles” feature
of PubMed and has become a benchmark within the field of bioinformatics for measuring
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similarity.
Recent work studying the movement of scientists has utilized pmra in order to trace their
trajectories through topics over time (Azoulay et al. 2015a; Azoulay et al. 2015b; Azoulay
et al. 2016). A novel feature of my implementation of the pmra algorithm is that I can
generate similarity scores between published journal articles and user-defined text13 . Thus,
I can compute the similarity between a scientists’ prior publications and (a) the research
objectives of a contest, or (b) their application abstracts, whether or not the application
resulted in any publications. Being able to explore the similarity in the requested or proposed
science whether or not the project resulted in publications is a major advantage of this
Chapter.
Because pmra requires publication abstracts as a part of its input, I make the assumption
that all of a scientists’ prior knowledge and skills are embodied within the journal articles
they have published previously. Indeed, the entire purpose of publications is to disclose
to the public the information each scientist has generated. Thus, the number of similarity
scores generated for each scientist will equal their number of prior publications. To simplify
this vector a single value for each scientist-abstract pair to I use the maximum score returned
by pmra for each scientist at the time of application14 . My intuition is as follows; if each
scientists’ set of publications defines the boundaries of their set of knowledge, then the
maximum similarity score between any single publication and the target abstract captures
the shortest proximity between the new science and the scientist. Certainly, the density of
one’s knowledge may vary within these boundaries, a new abstract may be “close” to a single
publication but “far” from the majority, but but relying simply on this maximum score my
measure captures only variation in similarity in information rater than depth of information.
Robustness checks in which I instead use the mean and median statistics show no significant
differences in the relative magnitudes of the results.
13
The code for my implementation of pmra was very kindly developed by W. John Wilbur of the NLM
who wrote the initial code for the algorithm.
14
For any applications listed with co-principal investigators I use the maximum of the two scientists scores
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3.3. Identification via Compensating Differentials
3.3.1. Scientific Choice Model
In order to clarify the parameters of interest, it is useful to model the decision of scientists
seeking resources in a setting of contests that solicit ideas and award resources to pursue
those ideas. The standard model of a contest’s ex-ante payoff is the expected probability
of success (receiving resources) times the value of the award (size of resources and the
production made possible) minus the costs of participation (generating the idea). I begin
by outlining the major forces at play for each of these three sets of parameters, and then
describe how they can vary for “open” - all types of ideas are permitted - or “targeted”
contests - a restricted set of ideas are permitted.
Entry Costs: Each scientist i can submit one idea of type s and quality q to a contest k.
Costs of developing the idea C depend on the scientist’s ability αi and contest-specific factors
ωk . Furthermore, I assume that variable costs are incurred per the scientific similarity, D,
between a scientists current type s0i (i.e. specialty) and the type they pursue in the contest
sik . In summary, the costs of applying to contest k are given by C(qiks | αi , D(s0i , sik ), ωk ).
This D function captures two important phenomena related to these changes in direction:
the transferability of resources as well as the ability to predict the value of these transfers.
First, scientists’ knowledge and resources may not be perfectly transferrable across types of
science. Human capital theory has long appreciated the limitations of specialized knowledge
(e.g. Becker 1962), while others have argued that this limited transferability may actually
lower costs of innovation when the problems at hand are particularly uncertain or novel
(Jeppesen and Lakhani 2010). Scientists will also face more tangible adjustment costs as
they must purchase or modify inputs to the research process. In the biomedical sciences,
these fixed costs of adjustment are substantial; individual pieces of lab equipment routinely
cost in excess $100,000. Thus, repeated adjustments may be inefficient simply because these
large fixed costs cannot be spread over multiple research projects. Additionally, because the
decision to pursue a research project must be made before, often years before, the true value
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of the project is revealed, scientists’ ability to accurately predict the value of pursuing a
subject may depend on their existing knowledge base on that subject. In line with the view
of bounded rationality, scientists may be biased in their ability to form expectations about
new opportunities less “local” to their prior endeavors (Nelson and Winter 1982; Levinthal
1997)15 .
Competitive Expectations: While these contests are certainly competitions, to simplify
the model I assume that conditional on the quality of a submission, qiks , these competitive
interactions are “fixed” in the sense that they vary only across contests per ωk and scientists
per αi . In other words, ωk is a reduced form summary of the competition and information
surrounding contest k (i.e. prize structure, expected entrants), and the scientist’s fixed-effect
αi is a reduced form summary of their ability to compete on average (i.e. form expectations
about competition). Essentially, I am defining expected outcomes, both in terms of success
and the size of the award conditional on success, to be solely a function of idea quality and
fixed differences across contests and scientists. This simplification of competitive interactions
is reasonable given how “small” each scientist relative to the field. As discussed in Section
2, these contests regularly involve anywhere from 40 to 700 entrants, amongst an potential
entrant pool in the tens of thousands16 .
Award Value: Conditional on success, the size of the award Awardiks is also a function of
idea quality. And since the awards in these contests are resources to pursue the idea submitted, I allow individuals to value both the resources themselves as well as the production they
enable, P (Awardiks ), conditional on the quality of the idea, which may complement or substitute for awards. To the inherent value of the resources, scientists may have “empire-building”
15

Should we expect, for example, a molecular biologist who specializes in parasitic nematodes to conduct
the mental calculus of predicting how good of an epidemiological study on diabetes they might be able to
perform? Perhaps not. A similar prediction of this aversion to less local ideas can be generated in a model
of rational expectations where information acquisition is a costly function of the locality of the new idea and
individuals are risk-averse. Here, scientists prefer local ideas not because they are unbiased, but because
they are less uncertain.
16
The number of unique applicants to the NIH during my 8-year time period is roughly 80,000 scientists.
Using a narrower definition of potential entrants, each of the 27 Institutes receive applications from roughly
1,700 unique scientists each year.
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preferences or, as is the case for academic scientists, are required by their institutions to
acquire a certain amount of grant funds each year. Additionally, they may value the signal
associated with these resources. Given the uncertainties of production in basic research, the
ex-ante quality of a scientists’ ideas - which largely influence the amount of resources they
can acquire - can provide additional information about their underlying ability. Indeed, it
is commonplace for academic scientists to publicize the number and size of grants they have
received.
Taking the three proceeding factors together, the payoff from a contest is given by
i
h

Uiks =E 1(Awardiks > 0) × V Awardiks , P (Awardiks ) | qiks , αi , ωk
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We are interested in how scientists respond to extra resources being made available (here, in
an RFA) given the costs of scientific redirections necessary to pursue those resources. The
elasticity of redirection is then based on (1) the costs of changing one’s research direction,
∂U
;
∂D(s0i ,sik )

and (2) the expected value of resources to be competed for,

∂U
∂E[1(Awardiks >0)×V ] .

As

the ratio of costs to expected value grows (the elasticity of redirection decreases) managers
will be forced to use larger prizes to induce their desired level of redirection. If it is very
costly to redirect scientists, then managers must place a very large value on a potential goal
to justify targeting resources towards it.
Ideally, to identify these parameters we would generate a random menu of potential grant
competitions that vary in terms of both the level of redirection they necessitate as well
as the nature of competition and rewards (expected payoff) they entail. If we could then
force scientists to choose a competition, their choices could be used to identify the point of
indifference when D(s0i , sik ) and E[1(Awardiks > 0)×V ] are equivalent and we could quantify
the expected dollar amount necessary to induce a given level of scientific redirection. If
67

managers know this parameter along with the distribution of scientists, they can evaluate
whether the costs of redirection are worth incurring given their preferences for the outcomes
of these redirections.
Conducting this experiment is practically prohibitive, but these targeted contests provide
a setting where scientists must make this precise tradeoff in a real-world setting. The NIH
creates a (plausibly exogenous) menu of RFAs that allocate a number of grants and funds to
certain types of science. These RFAs force scientists to ask themselves whether they should
compete in the open contests with the best idea of their choosing, or in the targeted contest
with the best idea that meets the objectives of that contest.
If I can empirically estimate the difference in expected value between the RFA and open
contests that arises from the NIH’s exogenous allocation decisions and scientists’ endogenous
responses, as well as the average level of redirection that RFAs induce beyond what is
observed in the open contests (∂D(s0i , sik )), then I can relate these two parameters. In this
way, I am phrasing the elasticity of redirection as a compensating differential: what is the
expected value of a grant competition such that scientists are indifferent between it and
a given level of redirection? This approach is in the same vein as Stern’s (2004) analysis
of job offers to biologists considering employment in industry and academia. Stern tests
whether scientists are willing to take lower salaries in exchange for the right to publish - “do
scientists pay to be scientists?” Here, I want to test whether scientists are willing to take on
competitions with lower expected value in exchange for the right to direct their own work do scientists pay to choose their science?
To fix ideas, consider a world where scientists can costlessly adjust the trajectories of their
research. That is to say, they do not care about the nature of their research, they generate
ideas of the same quality regardless of the topic or their existing knowledge, and can easily
acquire any inputs necessary. In this case, all contests, regardless of whether they are
targeted or not, should see competition to the point that their expected values are equivalent.
If a contest exists with larger prizes (e.g. grant funds, or expected publication outcomes)
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and/or an increased likelihood of success, then these “free-range” scientists would simply
enter this contest and compete down the expected value until it equates with the alternatives.
This world embodies the zero-profit nature of perfectly competitive markets with free entry.
Previously, I highlighted a number of forces that may limit scientists willingness to conduct
certain types of science, and thus prevent scientists from competing away rents that might
exist in targeted contests. This is analogous to economic models of markets where large
fixed costs prevent new entrants from competing away profit margins. Here, the fixed costs
of concern are the amount of redirection the targeted contests necessitate. As indicated
by Table 9, the RFA contests appear to be associated with both an increased likelihood of
success as well as larger grants conditional on success. This suggests that rents may remain
within these contests, but scientists are unable (or unwilling) to compete for them.
3.3.2. Data Construction
The two parameters of interest are the redirection effect and the expected payoff differences,
which will amount to three outcomes in my data that I formalized as follows: (1) the
scientific similarity of the application relative to the scientists’ prior publications; (2) the
probability of receiving a grant conditional on applying; and (3) the dollar amount of the
grant, conditional on receipt.
For the first outcome, I use pmra to calculate the standardized scientific similarity scores
between the applicants current application and prior publications to measure the degree of
redirection undertaken. Figure 13 separately plots this distribution for applications submitted in the open (investigator-initiated) and RFA (targeted) contests. The fact that the
distributions for RFA applications is shifted to the left indicates that the new projects proposed in these contests are less similar to scientists’ prior work compared to what scientists’
typically propose when left to their own devices.
The second outcome is a binary variable equaling 1 if the application is awarded a grant.
And for the third outcome, the value of the grant conditional on success, I construct the
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Figure 13: Scientific Similarity Distributions: Open vs. RFA

N ote: Scientific similarity score is calculated by the pmra algorithm for
each application based on scientists’ prior publications. Larger scores
indicate the science proposed in the application is more scientifically
similar to the scientists’ prior work.

lifetime value of each grant awarded, including all future funding years and extensions. Table
9 summarizes the unconditional win probabilities and award sizes, and summary statistics
of all outcomes for the estimation sample are presented in the results tables.
3.3.3. Empirical Specification
The goal of the analysis is to identify differences between open and RFA contests with
respect to these three outcomes. As a first pass, I could regress these outcomes for each
individual i’s application a to Disease-Science-Time contest dst on an indicator variable for
whether the application was submitted to an RFA as a simple test for the difference in means
between the two as follows:

yiadst = α + β1{RFAiadst } + iadst

(3.2)

where 1{RF A} is an indicator for whether or not the application was submitted to an
RFA contest. The main problem with identifying the parameters using this approach is
that, as indicated in Equation 3.1, it is impossible to disentangle whether observed changes
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in the outcomes are because of the RFAs and not any of the other sources of variation:
application-specific quality (qijk ); scientists-specific factors (αi ) and outside options (Ūi ); or
contest-specific differences (ωk ) that may vary across Institutes n at the NIH.
As a start, I could estimate Equation 3.2 with individual scientist, Science-Time and DiseaseTime effects to remove all of the variation across individuals and most of the variation across
contests. This approach would identify an RFA-specific treatment effect, which is a policyrelevant parameter for NIH administration. But if, for example, scientists place a significant
value (positive or negative) on features inherent to an RFA, such as relinquishing control
of their research or facing a narrower scope of competition, Equation 3.2 would not allow
me to separate this RFA-specific effect from the redirection effect. In order to make a more
general statement about the costs of scientific redirection, I need to remove any of the costs
and benefits unique to these targeted contests (ωk=t ).
I do so by exploiting variation in outcomes across both the targeted and open contests as
well as within two of the most common grant types, the R01 and R21. To recall, the R01
grant is the most common grant type at the NIH and is intended for “exploitation” research.
The R21 grant is intended to fund more “exploratory” research, and on average is about
65% smaller than R01 grants in dollar terms. Using variation in outcomes between these
two grant types enables a difference-in-difference approach, where I can condition out the
mean effects of scientists, grant type (R01 or R21) and RFAs. Because I can only observe
outcomes for individuals that chose to apply, my results are applicable to scientists who
have made the decision to apply to the NIH for funding and are faced with the choice of
which mechanism to enter. Scientists fixed effects and application quality measures provide
controls for selection by conditioning on a scientists’ underlying propensity to apply to the
NIH (scientists fixed-effects) as well as the possibility that those with the highest quality
ideas are more likely to apply.
To make the research design clear, consider again Figure 13. Essentially, when comparing
differences in redirection per my scientific similarity metric, I am testing whether or not
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the difference between the RFA and Open distributions for R01 grants is different than the
difference between the RFA and Open distributions for R21 grants. I estimate the following
equation for each outcome:
yiadst = αi + βj 1{R21iadst } + βk 1{RFAiadst } + βjk 1{R21, RFAiadst }+

(3.3)

γi Xiadst + δdt + τst + iadst
where 1{·} is an indicator for whether or not the application was submitted to an R01 grant
competition, an RFA contest or both. The coefficients βj and βk are the first-difference
effects of submitting an R21 or an RFA application, respectively. The focal coefficient βjk
captures the difference-in-difference of outcomes between the two grant and contest types.
Scientist (αi ) Disease-Time (δdt ) and Science-Time (τst ) fixed effects control for variation
across scientists and contests. The set of time-varying controls X depends on the outcome
and are described below.
While the scientist-fixed effects can condition on any stable differences across individuals,
it is also likely that scientists form expectations about the quality of each specific proposal
and their likelihood of success. To the extent they can do this accurately, scientists may
be more willing to undertake costly redirections when they predict their application is high
quality. Thankfully, because I can directly observe proposal quality, whether the application
is funded or not, such selection is not problematic17 .
Another selection concern relates to the fact that in a grant application, scientists must
request a specific dollar amount for their project, which plays a large role in determining
the final award amount, if successful18 . Thus, with respect to a selection bias, scientists
might be more likely to request larger amounts of funds when their expectations of success
are high. Also, more practically speaking, these fund requests are very indicative of the
17

Unless there is a behavioral bias present that some how generates a positive or negative correlation
between beliefs and actual quality. Discussions with NIH applicants suggest that this is very unlikely, as
expectations for each application are almost always set at the average success rates observed across the full
set of applications.
18
The correlation between realized and requested grant sizes, conditional on award, is 0.89.
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scope of work proposed. It would be difficult to compare the value of a $1 million grant
relative to a $1 thousand grant if the only reason for the difference was that the former
study required a $999 thousand dollar piece of equipment. From the scientists’ perspective,
it is not necessarily the total size of the grant that is valuable, but rather the fraction of the
amount they requested that is actually awarded - the grant surplus - that is valuable. If a
project is proposed and the scientist requests $1 million, then I assume that they value the
amount of funds they receive conditional on this request. This approach both addresses the
selection concern, and makes it possible to equate award sizes across projects that request
different funding levels. Therefore, I include the logged requested dollar amount as a control
in the regression.
My main assumption throughout these analyses is that the change in the outcomes associated with the decision to pursue an R21 grant and/or an RFA contest are valid estimates of
the counterfactual change for scientists that pursued the alternative grant (R01) and/or contest (open) types instead. Because these are one-time decisions, the traditional concern for
pre-trends in this research design is not warranted. Instead, the major threat to identifying
the focal effect βjk for each outcome is a correlation between the outcomes and unobserved
application-specific factors iadst . For example, if scientists would have made the observed
level of redirection conditional on the fixed effects, observed grade and funds requested regardless of whether or not they applied to the RFA contests and systematically choose to
enter RFA contests when making redirections larger than average, then I would overstate
the effect of entering these contests. In related work, analyses of science-level effects of RFAs
suggest that they do induce new science that would not have occurred otherwise, so I am
confident in the main assumption, which posits that, conditional on the rich set of controls,
such selection into these contests does not occur19 .
19

Anecdotal interviews with scientists who have participated in RFA competitions indicated that in all
cases scientists incorporated features into their proposed studies that they would not have otherwise and
that their submission to the RFA was at least in part induced by the RFA announcement itself.
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3.3.4. Results
Table 10 presents the results from estimating Equation 3.3 for the four outcomes. The main
effects (β coefficients) can be combined to estimate the elasticity of redirection, denoted by ε,
as follows: ε ≡

β SS
(1+β W P )∗β GV

, where the superscripts SS, W P and GV denote the outcomes

of scientific similarity, win probability and grant value, respectively. In other words, what is
the change in scientific similarity induced by a certain change in expected value of a contest.
Table 10: Compensating Differentials per Redirections

R21 × RFA
(βjk )

(1)
Scientific
Similarity
0.170***
(0.0160)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Pr(Win)

Award $

ε

-0.0424***
(0.0145)

-0.265***
(0.0442)

0.62

RFA
(βk )

-0.258***
(0.0105)

0.0750***
(0.00972)

0.236***
(0.0314)

1.01

R21
(βj )
Grade, $ Controls
Scientist F.E.
D-T, S-T F.E.
Obs.
R2
mean(DV)
sd(DV)

-0.213***
(0.00612)
Y
Y
Y
122,094
0.04
24.09
13.45

-0.0170***
(0.00625)
Y
Y
Y
56,718
0.57
0.199
0.40

-0.0924**
(0.0388)
Y
Y
Y
24,223
0.81
$1,323,760
$1,004,383

N ote: Dependent variables in columns (1) and (3) are standardized.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the scientist level. * p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Grade and $ controls include review grade for
models (1) - (3), standardized dollars requested for models (1) - (3).
Column (4) presents the first- (Row 1) and second-difference (Row 2)
estimates of the elasticity of direction, ε.

Looking first to the RFA-specific treatment effect (βk ) that is estimated in first-differences
(a la Equation 3.2), the second row of Table 10 indicates that, on average, applications to
RFA contests are 0.25 s.d. less scientifically similar than when applications are submitted
as investigator-initiated proposals. In terms of magnitude, this is a substantial effect. For
comparison, Row 3 of Table 10 indicates that the difference in scientific similarity between
R01 (exploitative) and R21 (explorative) grants in general is slightly lower at 0.21 s.d. Thus,
it appears these contests solicit work that is substantially different, in the scientific sense,
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than the average application submitted in the open contest. With the included controls there
is also a significant increase in win probability between the two contests of 7.5 percentage
points (36%), and the RFA awards are significantly larger (0.23 s.d. ≈ $240,000) than
their open contest counterparts. Thus, the wedge apparent in the raw data persists. These
three estimates together imply that for each 1 s.d. increase in the expected value of a
grant competition, the RFA contests are able to induce roughly the equivalent (1.08 s.d.)
magnitude of redirection. However, as discussed earlier, this does not separate RFA-specific
costs and benefits that may be unique to these mechanisms from the true costs of redirection
that is of interest more generally.
Row 1 of Table 10 reports the difference-in-difference estimates for the main outcomes.
Column 1 indicates that, compared to R01 grants, R21 grants submitted to RFA contests are
0.17 s.d. more scientifically similar (less redirected) than their open contest counterparts.
Columns 2 and 3 indicate that, compared to R01 grants, R21 grants submitted to RFA
contests are 4.2 percentage points (22%) less likely to be successful and 0.26 s.d. smaller
than their open contest counterparts. Taken together, these estimates imply that each 1
s.d. increase in the expected value of a grant competition can induce a scientists to pursue
a research project 0.65 s.d. less scientifically similar than they would have otherwise.
To get a sense of the economic magnitude of this effect, consider a scientist who has conducted preliminary research on subject A and is prepared to submit a $1 million R01 application for a large-scale study on this subject. Now what if instead the NIH would prefer
that this scientist pursues subject B, which would involve submitting the average R21 application to begin this “new” line of inquiry? Per my estimates and the sample means, the
NIH could incentivize this level of redirection if they held an RFA soliciting subject B and
awarded R21 grants roughly 180% larger than is customary: $450,000 as opposed to the
standard $250,000. Note that these magnitudes include the fixed costs and benefits that an
RFA provides (i.e. are based on the first differenced result). Looking beyond the RFAs at
the NIH, the amount of funds necessary to induce this level of redirection via this funding

75

incentive alone is roughly $650,000.
How should we interpret the discrepancy between the elasticity estimates from the firstdifferenced (Row 2, ε ≈ 1) and second-differenced (Row 1, ε ≈ 0.6) results? Aside from
requiring scientists to redirect their work, RFAs may involve a number of other fixed costs
and benefits. Because the second-differenced elasticity estimate, which remove these RFAfixed effects, is smaller than the first-differenced estimate it is implied that the fixed benefit
of these contests is significantly greater than any fixed costs (beyond the change in scientific
similarity). Although I cannot separately identify the magnitudes of these effects, it does
suggest that the narrow scope of competition relative to the size of the prizes is valuable in
this setting.
Table 11: Compensating Differentials for Scientist Subsets
(1)
(2)
Scientific
Pr(Win)
Similarity
Pane A: New Investigators
R21 × RFA
(βjk )

0.140***
(0.0416)

0.0450
(0.0432)

(3)

(4)

Award $

ε

0.0198
(0.112)

>1.14a

Obs.
37,654
16,471
7,432
R2
0.0400
0.550
0.880
mean(DV)
24.60
0.19
$1,386,899
sd(DV)
14.46
0.39
$817,495
Pane B: Experienced Investigators
R21 × RFA
(βjk )
Obs.
R2
mean(DV)
sd(DV)

0.186***
(0.0185)
84,440
0.0400
23.87
12.97

-0.0614***
(0.0170)
40,247
0.570
0.19
0.39

-0.317***
(0.0544)
16,791
0.810
$1,295,811
$1,075,642

0.55

N ote: Dependent variables in columns (1) and (3) are standardized.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the scientist level. * p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Grade and $ controls include review grade for
models (1) - (3), standardized dollars requested for models (1) - (3) and
standardized dollars awarded for model (4). All models include firstdifference controls (RFA and R21) and the full set of controls as in Table
10. Experienced investigators have received at least one NIH research
project grant prior to the focal application. Column (4) presents the
first- (Row 1) and second-difference (Row 2) estimates of the elasticity
of direction, ε.
a
The elasticity is not identified since no statistically significant differential in expected payoffs exists.
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Table 11 re-estimates the differential separately for “experienced” and “New Investigators”,
reporting only the second-difference coefficients. As expected, the younger, yet-to-win-atthe-NIH scientists are significantly more elastic than their search for funding. In fact, it
appears that the differential estimated in the full sample is driven entirely by the experienced
scientists. While the redirection levels are similar in magnitudes for the two subsets, there is
no statistically significant difference in the expected payoffs for the New Investigators. Thus,
I cannot identify their mean elasticity beyond a lower bound that reconciles the observed
redirection with a zero difference in expected payoffs.

3.4. Identification via Entry
3.4.1. Entry Model and Empirical Specification
Because the elasticity estimates of Section 3.3 are conditioned on the decision to seek funding
from the NIH, they are likely overestimates of the population mean. This is because the NIH
application decision is a function of a scientists budget constraints, which are unobservable,
where scientists in greater need of grant resources are both more willing to apply to the NIH
and undertake redirections for lower expected payoffs. In order to identify an estimate that
is not conditioned on this decision, this section estimates the elasticity of direction based on
scientists decisions to enter (or not) an RFA given the size of funds available and their own
scientific similarity to the research objectives.
Consider an entry model where scientists must incur some fixed costs to develop a research
proposal and enter a contest where a pre-specified amount of funds are allocated per the
number and quality of proposals submitted20 . All potential entrants N observe each grant
contest k, which are characterized by the total amount of funds available (Pursek ), the
expected number of competitors (n̂k ∈ (1, 2, ..., N )) and a vector of other contest characteristics (xk ; e.g. year, NIH Institute)21 . Entry costs are a function of the scientists’ similarity
20

This simultaneous entry and production feature is reflective of the fact that these contests are essentially
auctions, where scientists prepare research proposals as their “bids”.
21
This setup maintains the same structure as Equation 3.1 in a format similar to the homogenous firm
entry model described in Berry and Reiss (2007). But here, potential entrants are homogenous conditional
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to the contest objectives dik . A variable “profit” function V is then based on both contest
and scientist characteristics22 , such that each individual’s utility of entry is given by

Uik = V (Pursek , n̂k , xk , dik , αi ) − C(dik )

(3.4)

where αi is a stable, scientist-specific effect. The elasticity of redirection is then ε ≡
∂Uik
∂Uik
∂Pursek / ∂dik .

This definition is different from that presented in Section 3.3 where instead of

trading off direct resource compensation for redirections, scientists are now trading off the
“market size” (Pursek ) for redirections given their competitive expectations.
In order to identify the partial derivatives necessary, I make the simplifying assumption that
V is a linear function of its parameters yielding my main estimating equation23

Pr(Entryik ) = F (Pursek ) + G(n̂k ) − C(dik ) + xk βx + αi + µik

(3.5)

where µik are i.i.d. error terms that contain both random (mean-zero) noise from scientists’
decisions and, importantly, unobservable and potentially non-random contest features. Note
that although dik enters Equation 3.4 through both V and C, it only enters Equation 3.5
through C. Therefore C should be viewed as encompassing the aggregate effects of what
are traditionally thought of as adjustment costs (e.g. new equipment), as well as the costs
of producing a competitive research proposal24 .
The estimate of the elasticity of direction is then

F0
C0 .

For the purposes of a straightfor-

ward and interpretable estimation, I assume that F , C, and G are log-linear functions (i.e.
C(dik ) = βc × log(dik )).
on the individual-fixed effect αi , entry cost factors are observable and production occurs at entry.
22
This function also describes the rules by which the purse is allocated amongst entrants.
23
This is an admittedly strong assumption about both the nature of competition within these contests
as well as scientists’ utility over the outcomes. However, since the goal of this exercise is to estimate how
scientists trade off redirection costs for expected resources - and not to simulate complex counterfactuals
- these assumptions provide a transparent method for estimating the entry elasticity of direction for the
marginal entrant while controlling for first-order competitive effects.
24
∂V
That is to say, the C 0 (dik ) estimated from Equation 3.5 is actually ∂d
− C 0 (dik ) per Equation 3.4.
ik
This prevents me from disentangling the extent to which the elasticity of direction is driven by tangible costs
versus limitations on the production function (i.e. the substitutability of knowledge across topics).
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3.4.2. Approach to Endogenous Competition
The difficulty in estimating Equation 3.5 is that, instead of competitive expectations (n̂k ),
only the realized number of entrants (nk ) is observed. Now, if there are unobservable and
valued features of these contests not captured by xk (e.g. scientific potential, downstream
demand), then each scientists’ likelihood of entry will be positively correlated. This will
generate an endogeneity problem if Equation 3.5 is estimated with nk instead of n̂k , which
will bias estimates of G upward and then, potentially, F downward25 .
To address this issue, I utilize the procedure for estimating static strategic interactions proposed by Bajari et al. (2010)26 . Essentially, n̂k can be estimated if a variable exists that
influences each individual’s strategic choice directly but only influences others’ choices via
the indirect effect of those strategic choices. In what amounts to an instrumental variables
approach, estimates of n̂k can be obtained using variables that satisfy this “strategic” exclusion restriction. This approach is well-suited a setting where fixed costs of entry are
observable and orthogonal to post-entry production (or effort) costs. This is precisely the
case of the model outlined above with the scientific adjustment costs providing a valid instrument under the assumption that each scientists’ similarity to an RFA does not directly
influence any other scientists’ behaviors27 .
The estimation approach is as follows:
1. Regress entry decision (Entryik = {0, 1}) on the vector of contest controls, purse size,
individual-fixed effects and scientific similarity measure.
25

Recall that I am assuming that conditional on the covariates and fixed effects scientists are homogeneous. This implies preferences for the unobserved contest features are the same across the population,
which generates the positive correlation in entry probabilities and therefore a positive correlation between
Pr(Entryik ) and nk .
26
While there may certainly be dynamics with respect to each scientist’s decision to purse a particular
contest (e.g. how would moving to topic A effect future research prospects?), the limited recurrence of RFAs
and the massive scale of the default open competitions, which present a future option for funding, suggest
that competitive dynamics within each RFA are likely not first-order concern.
27
One mechanism that may invalidate this assumption is if scientists’ likelihood of communicating with
potential competitors about entry decisions is correlated with their similarity to an RFA. Anecdotal discussions with NIH applications who have competed in RFAs did not suggest high levels of communications
between “rival” laboratories.
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\ )
2. Calculate predicted entry probabilities, Pr(Entry
ik
3. Sum predicted entry probabilities over each contest, minus each individual’s own entry
P
\ ) ∀ i, j ∈
probability to estimate each individual’s n̂k , given by n
eik = j6=i Pr(Entry
jk
N
4. Estimate Eq. 3.5 using n
eik in place of n̂k
This approach has the added benefit of estimating a related parameter that I will refer to
as the entry elasticity: the percent change in entry probability given a 1% change in the
purse size, holding redirection costs and expected competition fixed. The magnitude of this
elasticity can shed some insight on the more general costs of incentivizing scientists to pursue
a particular direction purely through resource incentives.
3.4.3. Data Construction and Description
Estimating Equation 3.5 requires a dataset comprised of scientist-contest pairs containing (1)
all potential entrants, and (2) each potential entrant’s scientific similarity to the contest. To
arrive at a close approximation to the full set of potential entrants, I include any individual
that applied to the NIH from 2002 to 2009, totaling to 132,043 scientists. I then match each
scientist (and their publication history) with each of the 247 RFA announcements between
2002 and 2009 that solicite some combination of R01 and/or R21 research grants and for
which details on the timing, administration, research objectives and funds allocated were
available. For each of these pairs, pmra was then used to calculate the scientific similarity
between the scientists’ prior publications and the research objectives of the contest.
Thus, this research design resembles a typical study of firm entry behavior, but, instead of a
very small number of firms, potential markets and instruments such as geographic distance,
this data is characterized by a large number of individuals and potential prizes, and will
utilize the instrument of scientific distance. The relationship between entry and scientific
similarity is made clear in Figure 14.
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Figure 14: Entry per Scientific Similarity

N ote: Local polynomial smooth plot. Scientific similarity score is calculated as the maximum pmra algorithm score between each scientists’
set of prior publications and the research objectives of the RFA. Larger
scores indicate the science requested in the RFA is more scientifically
similar to the scientists’ prior work.

3.4.4. Results
Table 12 presents the results of estimating Equation 3.5 using both the OLS approach based
on observed competition nk (odd columns), and the instrumental variables approach of
Bajari et al. (2010) using n
eik (even columns). Clearly, OLS appears to result in a severe
bias such that scientists appear to not value larger purses and prefer larger numbers of
competitors. Certainly, given the unique preferences of scientists and the uncertainty and
information asymmetries of science, it may be the case that these individuals behavior is as
such. However, accounting for the endogeneity of these interactions presents a much more
intuitive picture where scientists prefer larger purses and smaller sets of competitors.
With only contest-level controls, the estimates indicate an elasticity of direction of roughly
0.5 - close to the magnitude identified via the compensating differentials approach. But
when conditioning on scientist-fixed effects, the magnitude ε is estimated to be about half
as large at 0.24. This large discrepancy between the two specifications suggests that there
is a significant fraction of scientists who are (A) both inherently more likely to enter RFA
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contests and do so from a far distance, and/or (B) both inherently unlikely to enter RFA
contests despite their close proximity.
Table 12: Entry Determinants and Elasticities
log(Sci. Sim.ik )

(1)
0.000384***
(0.0000235)

(2)
0.000418***
(0.0000247)

(3)
0.000395***
(0.0000241)

(4)
0.000442***
(0.0000257)

(5)
0.000658***
(0.0000568)

(6)
0.000906***
(0.0000569)

log(Pursek )

0.00000657
(0.0000138)

0.000186***
(0.0000292)

0.0000309*
(0.0000164)

0.000218***
(0.0000265)

0.0000301
(0.0000216)

0.000218***
(0.0000241)

log(nk )

0.000233***
(0.0000199)

log(n
g
ik )

0.000201***
(0.0000181)
-0.000134***
(0.0000345)

Contest Controls
Scientist F.E.

Y

0.000193***
(0.0000201)
-0.000184***
(0.0000313)
Y

Y
Y

-0.000143***
(0.0000250)
Y
Y

ε

0.44

0.49

Entry Elasticity
Share Avg. Grant
for +1 Entrant

0.62

0.71

0.70

31.2%

27.1%

27.5%

0.24

N ote: Mean entry probability 0.0002942. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the RFA contest level.
βlog(Purse )

k
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. ε is the elasticity of direction per β
. “Entry Elasticity” is the percent change in
log(Sci. Sim.ik )
entry probability given a 1% change in the Purse size. “Share Avg. Grant for +1 Entrant” is the growth in Purse size necessary to
induce the marginal entrant, in expectation, expressed as a percent of the average grant awarded.

Given the substantial differences in the elasticity of direction between new and experienced
scientists identified in Section 3.3, Table 13 estimates the entry determinants for these two
subsamples to see if the difference arises in this alternative approach28 . Again, the New
Investigators are more elastic with their direction; however, not to the degree observed once
conditioning on the decision to apply.
Tables 12 and 13 also present the estimates for entry elasticities, and to facilitate interpretation, growth in Purse size necessary to induce one additional entrant, given as a percent
of the average grant size for each specific sample. Under the assumptions of the empirical
model, this latter measure represents the average total costs scientists face when preparing
an NIH application (in terms of the corresponding grant value) - roughly 27% of a grant,
or $95,000 on average. Interestingly, while the New Investigators appear to be more elastic
with respect to the direction of their science, they also appear to be slightly more inelastic
with respect to RFA entry, relative to their experienced colleagues. Why might this be
the case? Recall that the aforementioned benefits of this designation are within the open
28

In the specifications of Table 13, nf
ik is still estimated using the full sample of scientists.
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Table 13: Entry Determinants and Elasticities, by Scientist Experience
(1)
New Investigator
0.00111***
(0.0000847)

(2)
Experienced
0.00172***
(0.000109)

log(Pursek )

0.000284***
(0.0000354)

0.000378***
(0.0000438)

log(nf
ik )

-0.000211***
(0.0000414)
Y
Y

-0.000288***
(0.0000453)
Y
Y

ε

0.26

0.22

Entry Elasticity
Share Avg. Grant
for +1 Entrant

0.710

0.740

23.50%

15.20%

log(Sci. Sim.ik )

Contest Controls
Scientist F.E.

N ote: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the RFA contest level.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. ε is the elasticity of direction per
βlog(Purse )
k
. “Entry Elasticity” is the percent change in entry probability
β
log(Sci. Sim.ik )

given a 1% change in the Purse size. “Share Avg. Grant for +1 Entrant”
is the growth in Purse size necessary to induce the marginal entrant, in
expectation, expressed as a percent of the average grants awarded to either
applicant type.

contests, not RFAs. The New Investigator’s relatively larger entry costs (24% versus 15%
of a grant) are driven partly by this difference, but more so by their smaller eventual grant
awards (85% the size of experienced investigator’s awards on average).

3.5. Discussion
Managers face a unique set of issues when directing highly specialized individuals be they
scientists, engineers or artists; they often lack information about who in particular should
be assigned each specific task. To overcome this challenge organizations often rely on mechanisms, such as contests, that allow individuals to self-select into opportunities most suited
to their skills and knowledge. The usefulness of these mechanisms depend critically on how
individuals tradeoff the value of the prize (which are often resources to conduct work) and
the costs of redirecting themselves.
These are precisely the issues facing the National Institutes of Health. This Chapter explores
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the NIH’s attempts to overcome the constraints of a high-skilled workforce and induce new
research with targeted grant competitions. I use data on all applications to the Institutes
for eight years along with a novel text algorithm in order to conduct two complementary
analyses to identify the elasticity of direction - how much scientists tradeoff changes to their
research trajectory in exchange for resources to conduct that research, or in other words,
the adjustment costs of science.
My estimates range from 0.24 to 0.6, magnitudes that suggest relatively large amounts of
grant resources are needed to induce directional changes in the scientific workforce29 . In
a similar vein, Stern (2004) finds that scientists are willing to take salaries 25% lower in
exchange for the right to publish. So, it appears that scientists are willing to pay to be
scientists, and some also to choose their own science. But in this case, the extent to which
this elasticity is a function of scientists’ preferences, real adjustment costs (e.g. equipment)
or the substitutability of knowledge in the scientific production function is an important,
unresolved question.
How generalizable are these findings? Certainly the types of scientists pursuing funding
from the NIH are a particular set of innovators, often based at academic institutions and all
pursuing biomedical research projects. But by and large they are not the prototypical “aloof”
scientists who answer to none, have unlimited resources and pursue the most fundamental
questions of nature with disregard for applicability. These individuals still report to senior
figures at their institutions (i.e. Department Heads, Deans), are pursuing science with
relatively short-term implications, and maintain close personal and professional ties with
staff, colleagues and competitors, all while balancing a number scientific and non-scientific
responsibilities. Thus, the tradeoffs I examine here are likely to be applicable to many
scientists who operate on the edge of basic and applied research.
As in the case of the NIH, contests have become an increasingly popular mechanism to both
29

Importantly, this is conditional on the current background infrastructure of support for science - the
outside options - which, if drastically altered, could certainly influence these magnitudes.
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identify innovative opportunities and direct the workforce towards them (Terwiesch and Ulrich 2009; Williams 2012). The usefulness of contests to induce effort in R&D settings has
long been appreciated (Moldovanu and Sela 2001; Che and Gale 2003). And recent empirical
work by Boudreau et al. (2011) and Boudreau et al. (2016b) provide stark empirical support
for these predictions in a setting with psuedo-random assignment to contests, thereby removing issues of self-selection from their analyses. In this Chapter, it is precisely the nature
of self-selection that I investigate. Thus, these results contribute to a growing literature on
the use of resource allocations as sorting mechanisms and the particulars of incentivizing
this sorting amidst high-skilled workers30 .
Measurement and empirical challenges have long prevented in-depth investigations of this
parameter, despite the clear need for understanding its magnitude. Given the lack of evidence, it is not surprising that research policies, such as those designed to address the
“bottleneck” in translational biomedical research (e.g. Collins 2011), have not traditionally
considered that allocating funds to particular areas is not only necessary to conduct the
research but it must also incentivize the choice of scientists’ to redirect their research to
that area.

30
For other examples, see work on local governments crowd-sourcing inspection algorithms (Glaeser et al.
2016), hospitals hosting tournaments to improve the workplace (Blasco et al. 2016) and pharmaceutical firms
adopting venture capital-like funding contests to identify promising therapies (Lerner 2012)
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CHAPTER 4 : A Ricardian-Demand Explanation for Changing Pharmaceutical
R&D Productivity
This Chapter is based on joint work with Mark Pauly

4.1. Introduction
Considerable criticism has been expressed about the research and development process for
new drugs since at least the 1990s. Compared to those years, estimates of private R&D cost
per new drug that makes it to market have been high and rising rapidly, more than tripling.
The volume of new drugs was flat for much of the period. While it is hard to construct
a price index for a mix of new products, there certainly have been complaints about the
prices of those new products. The perception of limited introduction of truly novel drugs
procured at dizzying research costs and sold at surprisingly high prices have led to feelings
of malaise on the part of the industry and feelings of outrage by its critics1 . Despite a
little improvement recently, the drug development model has broken, people say, but there
is no generally accepted account of why and how, and what if anything to do to put it back
together again. Maybe it was the FDA’s fault for restrictive and costly rules and procedures.
Maybe it was the failure of firm management in managing the discovery process as well as
it had in the past, as science changed in way that required adaptation. Maybe scientists
were preoccupied with publication and grant financing. Maybe the number of good ideas
in science were as numerous and attractive as ever, but there was some kind of glitch in
translating them into clinically useful products (Scannell et al. 2012).
In this Chapter we try to explain what happened (and to some extent deflect this blame
game) by using new disaggregated data on NIH and US private firm R&D investment across
time and across therapeutic categories to establish the relationship between these two sources
of inputs for drug discovery and development and the associated output in terms of New
Medical Entities (NMEs): a new drug production function. Our best data are for the years
1

See for example, Hewitt, Campbell & Cacciotti. Beyond the shadow of a drought: the need for a new
mindset in pharma R&D. Oliver Wyman, 2011.
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up to 2000, but we extend the analysis to 2013 with our empirical approach. We begin
with a simple production function and use it to estimate the marginal NME product of each
type of spending. We then tell a story about those estimates that draws on a demand side
explanation for both investments in new products and their R&D costs.
Disaggregated data on firm investments across therapeutic categories enables us to estimate
the relationship between private R&D investment and (1) exogenous shifts in potential
market size driven by demographic trends as suggested by Acemoglu and Linn (2004), and
(2) prior investments in basic research at the National Institutes of Health (NIH). These
two factors alone an explain a substantial proportion, nearly 90%, of the variation in R&D
investments within each category, and predict a private marginal cost per new molecular
entity (NME) in line with previous estimate for this time period.
We assume that there are two inputs into the production of NMEs of a particular category
(such as cancer, cardiovascular, etc.): spending on research by NIH institutes, and spending
on R&D by private firms. NIH spending may sometimes be thought of as a public good,
developing information useful for many new products at near-zero marginal cost per additional user. But not all NIH research necessarily is a public good in the non-excludable
sense, because NIH funding of university research can become intellectual property for the
university or its assignees under the Bayh-Dole act, with no repayment to the taxpayers who
funded the research. Conversely there is nothing to prevent a private firm from supporting
basic research as well as applied research. Finally, not all spending in both sectors supports
clinical research (rather than marketing or community outreach). While our data on these
inputs may over- or under-estimate their true values for these reasons, we are mainly concerned with changes in the relationships within our model. Thus, bias will only arise if our
measurement errors are correlated with other factors of the model and persist conditional
on our controls.
We also explore the impact of private spending. If it is random and uncorrelated with
public investments, it will not affect the estimated productivity of NIH spending and will
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itself have an unbiased coefficient. But there are strong reasons to think that firms respond
to NIH findings, and this we explore in considerable detail. In addition, we assume, in
the spirit of Acemoglu and Linn (2004), that private investment responds to the “size of
the market” (specifically, potential annual gross revenues) for particular categories of drugs
in particular time periods. Managers will have expectations about the future of certain
therapeutic markets, and will allocate their investments accordingly. After first treating
private spending as an included exogenous variable, we then explore the consequences both for measures of NIH productivity and private firm productivity - of treating private
spending as endogenous. Along the way we consider the interesting question of whether
NIH spending has a positive or inverse effect on private spending. However, for the most
Figure 15: Private NME R&D Investments: Actual and Predicted

Note: Actual spending data based on estimates of (1) total U.S. domestic R&D
and (2) share of R&D for New Molecular Entities (NME) from PhRMA annual
reports. Predicted R&D is based on the relationship between potential market
size and NIH spending estimated with pre-2001 data.

policy relevant time period we would like to study, post-2000 compared to pre- we only
have aggregated industry R&D data, which prohibits a more straightforward analysis. To
overcome this limitation and attempt to diagnose the changes observed in this timeframe,
we generate estimates of predicted private R&D spending as a function of future demand
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and prior NIH spending. We then use those predicted values to estimate the production
function for the second half of the period, where we are especially interested in changes
in NIH and private R&D productivity. We interpret these descriptive empirical results in
terms of a model of the supply of and demand for investment in new drugs, with special
emphasis on the role of consumers’ willingness to pay for new drugs.
Figure 15 shows the accuracy of our predictive model (described in detail below); it plots the
sum of these predicted values alongside actual aggregate spending to illustrate the significant
role of potential demand and basic science in generating private investments. The figure also
highlights the scope of our analyses - we can only explore changes in the productivity of
R&D dollars invested in response to the industry’s major forces of supply and demand. Still,
our results speak to the productivity of “real” R&D at the firm, irrespective of changes in
regulations or other external industry-wide shocks that influence costs or production beyond
the R&D phase. The accuracy of prediction clearly drops after 2000 (often under-predicting
private R&D) but still remains reasonably close in terms of trend. That firms invested more
than was predicted while the rate of NME approvals remained flat is suggestive of one type
of productivity decline in this period (drugs per R&D dollar), however, these may still have
been optimal investments from firms’ perspectives if the growth in future demand suggested
firms would remain productive in generating economic profits (returns per R&D dollar) even
at lower rates of new drug productivity.

4.2. Theoretical Motivation: David Ricardo and Productive Ideas
One of the major contributions of the economist David Ricardo was the distinction between
price mechanisms for different kinds of production inputs. Ricardo argued the productivity
of agriculture depended on the type of input. Most inputs (e.g. seed, animals) had their
prices determined by the marginal cost of producing them, and in turn affected the price
of crops. But the price of land (rent) was a different story; in this case, rather than the
price of the final output being “cost determined,” it was more correct to say that its price or
cost per unit was determined by the price of the final product, itself a function of demand.
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The simple notion is that the stock of arable land is exogenous (or at least fixed in the
short run) but its price is determined by demand. His key insight for our purposes is
that, as increases in demand bring more, less fertile, land into production, productivity will
necessarily decline. That decline is an inevitable result of moving on to the set of next
most profitable opportunities. Indeed, in this model with supply of opportunities fixed and
growing demand, increases in demand must result in declining measured productivity with
no person or institutional change being at “fault”.
We propose a similar process determining the R&D cost per new drug. Our implied theoretical model is as follows: exogenous inputs, namely public investments in basic science and
demographic-driven demand growth, determine the distribution of new drug ideas per their
expected profitability. An increase in demand that may arise from growth in population
size, income or insurance coverage will increase the return on investment across all potential drug opportunities, causing ideas with costs too high to justify investment under prior
(lower) demand to become potentially profitable. But importantly, unless these demand
shocks are accompanied by equal growth in the supply (or quality) of these ideas, these
newly profitable ideas have the same lower expected productivity (higher costs) from when
demand was lower.
That is, increasing the output of new drugs in response to demand increases has to lower
the productivity of R&D when inputs are scarce - without anyone being at fault, without
any evildoers creating glitches, scientists being distracted, and without any industry’s R&D
model breaking. Unless there is an equivalent offset in the number or quality of ideas - a
scientific discovery or a surge in NIH investments - increasing R&D costs per new product
is an expected fate in a world with growing demand. The movement to “high hanging fruit”
is not bad luck; it is a result of firms’ rational investment decisions. Figure 2 illustrates
this distribution of R&D opportunities and how the optimal investment decision changes as
demand and costs determine the expected profits associated with each potential new drug.
The figure shows a distribution of new drug ideas by their expected value based on expected
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Figure 16: Illustrative Count of Drug Candidates and the Role of
Demand and Costs

revenues and costs (Expected Value = (Expected Revenues × Success Rate) - Expected
Costs).
Our underlying intuition is that firms observe this distribution and select profitable ideas
(Expected Value > 0) to commercialize. In practice, this amounts to monopoly rents being
competed away post patent expiration. However, this distribution can be “restocked” in
the sense that investments in basic research can change the number and/or quality of the
ideas. Thus, the distribution represents the quality of ideas at a fixed point in time. Our
empirical analyses will explore year-to-year changes in its shape. With information on the
shape and evolution of this distribution one could predict both the number of new products
(the number of ideas multiplied by the average success rate conditional on the Expected
Value > 0) and expected net revenues (the sum of success rates multiplied by revenues for
Expected Value > 0).
Holding costs constant, an increase in total demand will shift the distribution to the right as
larger expected revenues increase the value of all ideas. Now, ideas previously unprofitable
because of high costs relative to revenues are chosen for investment. Without any changes
to the productivity of an industry increases in demand will spur higher spending on the
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research and development of new products.
Conditional on demand, changes in the expected costs (success probability times actual
costs) can affect the distribution in two important ways. Increases in the costs of the
marginal project will shift the slope of the distribution downward, while increases in the
average costs across all projects (which includes any fixed costs of having a non-zero number
of projects) will shift the intercept of the distribution downward, and vice versa for decreases
in these costs. Diagnosing the productivity of this industry is, in effect, identifying what (if
anything) happened to the shape of this distribution.
To be clear, this figure depends on the productivity (profitability) of the marginal and average R&D idea and not the marginal or average productivity of each R&D dollar. However,
project-level data of any industry is extremely difficult to obtain and in this Chapter our
data on firm investments are aggregated to the therapeutic-class level. Thus, our empirical
estimates will be based on changes in the total dollars invested within each class over time
and will technically identify the average and marginal productivity of R&D dollars. But
given the high fixed costs of pharmaceutical R&D that we are measuring, we will instead
interpret our results as providing insight into changes over time in the productivity of the
average and marginal ideas.
What drives differences in the costs associated with these ideas? Looking across ideas, recent
work from Budish et al. (2015) highlights the importance of variation in the costs across
projects for different types of cancers and find evidence of distortions away from research on
early-stage cancers, which have a larger clinical trial costs2 . Looking across time, increases in
the length and complexity of clinical trials, which would decrease the average profitability of
ideas, has been observed over the past decades. Regulatory burdens such as longer approval
times and larger post-marketing surveillance efforts have also been cited as sources of larger
total (average) costs in the industry (Kola and Landis 2004).
2

Because the clinical trials must follow patients for much longer to reach clinical endpoints. The authors also discuss the role of “short-termism” whereby agency problems in the management process induces
inefficient discounting that incentivizes the pursuit of shorter clinical trials (Budish et al. 2015).
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In terms of the farmers first studied by Ricardo, comparing the productivity of the marginal
and average new drug opportunity is analogous to evaluating whether increases in demand
encouraged farmers to seek out land that was less fertile (decreasing productivity of the
marginal idea) or incur higher fixed costs of transporting crops to market (decreasing productivity of the average idea).
This distinction of marginal and average costs is essential for understanding how certain
policies will influence production in this industry. For example, R&D tax subsidies typically
offset marginal R&D expenditures (since they’re granted as a share of expenditures), while
market exclusivity provisions and other prizes in effect reduce the average (fixed) costs of
eligible trials. Some policies, such as the Orphan Drug Act, operate on both margins in
that they provide prizes (exclusivity) and subsidies (tax breaks). Despite this importance,
delineating between these two margins does not appear to occur regularly in policy debates
or analyses of the pharmaceutical industry. In diagnosing this industry, we will make clear
where our estimates indicate changes have occurred, on average or the margin. Figure 3
Figure 17: Identifying Production Shocks amidst Demand Growth

provides a visual depiction of the empirical analysis as it pertains to the distribution of
ideas presented in Figure 2. Consider a monopolist firm who observes demand and sets
production costs c which determine quantity produced q per q = β(c). Demand at time
t = 0 determines the optimal quantity q0∗ . As researchers, we observe c0 and q0 , and then
by assuming that firms optimally invested in R&D given their expectations of demand can
93

recover an estimate of the productivity parameter at this time, denoted βa .
Now consider the next time period t = 1 where the optimal quantity to deliver is q1∗ ,
0

and we researchers observe c∗1 (Figure 3B). Because c1 is less than c∗1 , we can infer that the
distribution of ideas presented in Figure 2 has changed. Here, σ (the intercept) captures any
level changes in the distribution, while the difference between βa and βb captures any change
in the slope of the distribution. As drawn, the two production functions in t = 1 achieve
q1 for the same total (average) costs. While this is certainly a unique case, it demonstrates
that when observed in the cross-section it is impossible to discern average versus marginal
changes in the productivity of ideas, the goal of our exercise. This motivates our use of only
within-drug category variation in order to condition out time invariant differences across
drug classes.

4.3. Empirical Production Function
We model the number of NMEs approved by the FDA in therapeutic category j in time t
as a reduced form conditional Poisson model as
exp(βXjt + σt )
+ jt
τ =t exp(βXjτ + στ )

NMEjt = P

(4.1)

where Xjt is a vector of category-time specific inputs to the production process and σt are
industry-wide shocks to average productivity. This formulation accommodates the count
nature of our dependent variable while conditioning out time-invariant differences across
therapeutic categories (e.g. fixed costs of a clinical trial). These average differences appear
to be substantial, accounting for roughly 30% of the observed variation in NME output and
nearly 80% of the observed variation in private R&D spending across therapeutic categories3 .
We begin by assuming that our two main production determinants of Xjt are (1) lagged
private R&D, and (2) lagged public basic science are exogenously determined, and estimate
3

These estimate are from log transformed OLS models with therapeutic category fixed effects, since
coefficients of these effects are not estimated in the conditional Poisson specification. Although these specifications are obviously biased, they provide a sense of the magnitude of these effects.
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our main equation (1).
Importantly, some models will be presented without time period fixed effects to inform
calculations of the implied marginal products per each input. Such “cost per NME” calculations, which are intended to inform managers and policymakers, should not control for
industry-wide trends because the influence of such trends on the dependent variable is part
of the main story. Any estimates of costs based on elasticities estimated in models demeaned
by (statistically significant) time trends is likely to over- or underestimate productivity if
aggregate productivity is decreasing or increasing, respectively. Moreover, at least as far as
NIH spending is concerned, spending in one clinical category may have positive effects on
productivity in other categories (e.g., the research that lead to Avastin a cancer drug also
led to Lucentis an eye drug).
Private firms were likely not funding R&D projects at random even in the period of low
productivity, but are rather responding strategically to prior investments in basic science,
future expectations of demand and their consequences for profits in excess of normal economic profits. And because we cannot identify exogenous firm characteristics, estimating
equation (1) including private spending along with the supply of science and ignoring the
demand for certain types of drugs would confound firm-level and endogenous market-level
characteristics, biasing our estimates of β.
Hence, we also write a two-stage model of investment decisions and production where private
R&D in class j at time t is determined by market-level characteristics SDjt that include our
demand measure and NIH spending

log(R&Djt ) = β0 + βSD SDjt + δj + µt + εj t

(4.2)

which in turn determines NME output within classes over time per

NMEjt = P

exp(βR log(R&Djt ) + σt )
+ vjt
τ =t exp(βR log(R&Djτ ) + στ )
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(4.3)

When disaggregated data on private spending is available, we can estimate a joint variant of
these equations using instrumental variables via Generalized Method of Moments as outlined
by Blundell et al. (2002)4 .
Given our data limitations of lacking post-2000 category specific investments (described
below), we will also implement a two-step version of these equations under the assumption
that the causal effects of supply and demand conditions estimated in the first stage (βSD )
are persistent. Then, substituting predicted private R&D into the second equation, we
can test for significant changes in βR post-2000 which would indicate productivity changes.
Furthermore, we can still test whether or not public investments in basic science have any
direct effect on NME output beyond their ability to stimulate private investment.
It is worth noting that a key determinant of investment beyond forces of supply and demand
(per SDjt ) is firms’ expectations about their own production functions, βr and σt . Changes
in expectations about these parameters would be captured in our model by the µt term in
equation (3). For example, if firms knew in advance that was to change in future periods,
perhaps due to frictions in the labor market, and responded by changing investments across
all categories, then this would manifest in µt . However, we cannot estimate these time-period
fixed effects for years we lack disaggregated investment data.
Therefore any changes in βr or σt that we identify post-2000 are related to changes only in
the productivity of the private R&D instrumented by our measures of supply and demand.
We do not know whether there were unobserved industry-wide forces that prompted firms
to invest additional amounts in R&D beyond what was predicted by the pre-2000 model.
It is plausible there were unrealistically optimistic expectations of success. Supply side
changes, like changes in FDA policies that made approval unexpectedly less likely, might
also come have into play. If such changes in policy had been expected so that anticipated
profits were reduced, that should have led to cutbacks in investment (or at least a slowing
4

We kindly thank Timothy Simcoe for making a STATA implementation of this procedure available on
his website at http://people.bu.edu/tsimcoe/data.html.
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of growth relative to trend), something that did appear to have happened (see Figure 15).
In fact, R&D investments grew at a rate greater than we might have expected given firms’
estimated responsiveness to the NIH and consumers’ demand. Later, we hypothesize reasons
underlying this discrepancy, including a decline in abnormal industry profits and a feature
of our demand measure that does not take the rising value of health into account5 . Still,
the variation we can explore is important because it speaks directly to real R&D dynamics
induced by market-wide forces, regardless of changes to the industry-specific environment.
Thus, although this is a study of pharmaceutical productivity, we are examining variation
likely the most generalizable to other industries.

4.4. Data Construction
This section describes our main data sources and how they were utilized to construct our four
key variables: private pharmaceutical R&D, exogenous potential demand (per Acemoglu and
Linn (2004)), NIH investments in basic science, and New Molecular Entities approved by
the FDA; as well as how we determined the structure of our sixteen therapeutic categories.
4.4.1. Drug Categories & FDA Approvals
Determining the specificity of drug categories for our empirical analysis is a tradeoff between
the ability to control for important (more delineated categories) versus allowing for spillovers
given the idiosyncratic nature of R&D (fewer broad categories). Although private R&D
investments are only available for eight drug categories as detailed below, the demand and
NIH data can more easily be decomposed into more specific categories.
Using the Anatomical Therapeutic Class (ATC) categorization scheme as a guide, we matched
the eight industry R&D categories to the most obviously corresponding sixteen subgroups
of the ATC hierarchy as shown in Table 146 . The real outcome we are concerned with is
5

The potential demand measure holds the income elasticity of demand for new spending and new technology fixed at one. There is good evidence that this elasticity is in fact both greater than 1 and possibly
increasing over time (Hall and Jones 2007). In fact, the estimates considered by Hall and Jones (2007) are
large enough to plausibly explain the full gap in R&D investment we observe.
6
Average cost estimates require that we aggregate mean inputs to the eight categories. The main results
and directions of effects carry through if we conduct all analyses at the eight category only.
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Table 14: Drug Category Crosswalk
Private R&D

Matched ATC

Category

Category

Anti-Infective

1. Anti-infective, non-viral [J01-J04]
2. Anti-viral [J05]
3. Parasitic [P]

Biological /

1. Biological / Immunological [L02-L04]

Immunological
Cancer /

1. Cancer [L01]

Endocrine /

2. Diabetes / Obesity [A08, A10]

Metabolism

3. Hormonal [H]
4. Endocrine, reproductive [G03]

Cardiovascular

1. Blood [B]
2. Cardiovascular, non-blood-specific [C]

Central Nervous

1. CNS [N]

System / Eye

2. Eye [S01]

Gastrointestinal /

1. Gastrointestinal [A01-A07, A09, A11-A15]

Genitourinary

2. Kidney / Gynecological / Urological
[G01, G02, G04]

Respiratory

1. Respiratory [R]

Dermatological

1. Dermatological / Musculoskeletal [D, M]

Note: Private R&D categories are the most disaggregated levels of research
and development investments reported in historical PhRMA reports. Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical Classification System (ATC) categories are used to
classify drugs in the drug approval and utilization (demand) data.
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welfare changes as a result of new products released by the pharmaceutical industry. Because data necessary to calculate welfare is rarely available (i.e. drug-specific revenues and
quality-adjusted life years generated), it has become common practice to evaluate the count
of new drugs approved. Obviously a raw count of all drug approvals would place the same
weight on all drugs whether they are revolutionary therapies such as statins or reformulations of age-old drugs such as aspirin. To alleviate some of this discrepancy it has also
become common practice to restrict attention to approvals at the FDA that receive new
molecular entity (NME) status. Newly approved drugs receive the NME status if the active
moiety has not yet been approved by the FDA, thus providing a strong indication that the
therapy has some potential to provide significant welfare improvements.
The count of annual approvals of new molecular entities (NMEs) from 1987 to 2013 was
constructed from the Drugs@FDA database7 . The database does provide information as to
the sponsoring firm of each drug approval; however, it is prohibitive to track the “ownership”
of any given drug over time given the prevalence of firm- and drug-level acquisitions, as well
as licensing and manufacturing agreements. Thus, we do not restrict our sample to any set
of firm sponsors. Drugs were matched to each therapeutic category per their primary ATC
codes.
4.4.2. Private R&D Expenditures
Estimates of industry-wide investments in pharmaceutical R&D from 1970 to 2013 were
constructed based on annual reports from the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
of American (PhRMA), the industry’s lead trade group. PhRMA conducts annual surveys
of its member companies and reports summarized results for a number of relevant statistics.
Using historical reports8 , we obtained PhRMA-wide estimates of: total industry R&D, the
share of R&D allocated to new/innovative product lines (e.g. NMEs), and the share of R&D
allocated across eight major therapeutic categories as outlined in Table 14.
7

Available at http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/InformationOnDrugs/ucm079750.htm
Reports prior to 2002 are not publicly available, but PhRMA representatives kindly shared copies of
annual reports from 1990 to 2001 containing data from as early as 1972.
8

99

The share of R&D allocated to NME-type research is not decomposed by therapeutic categories and is reported in only a select number of annual reports 1998-2000. The average
reported allocation is 78.3% and we choose to make the assumption of 80% for the entirety
of our sample period and across each category.
The largest caveat to this data is that therapeutic category-specific investments are not
available post-2000. Hence the projection methodology described in the proceeding section.
Additionally, because PhRMA underrepresents the industry as a whole we will likely underestimate real industry-wide investments and therefore also underestimate the average cost
per NME. So long as any level of misrepresentation is fixed over time, it will not bias our
estimates of marginal productivity.
Our final estimate of industry investment must account for the notoriously long development
times in this industry- investments in any given year may be related to drugs anywhere from
1 to 15 years away from approval. Based on an average development time of ten to twelve
years and an average approval time of at least one year, we sum within-category expenditures
from years t − 11 to t − 1 to generate our preferred measure. All private investments are
deflated using the Biomedical Research and Development Price Index to account for inflation
unique to this sector.
4.4.3. Exogenous Potential Demand
In their initial analyses of market size and innovation in the pharmaceutical sector, Acemoglu
and Linn (2004) develop a plausibly exogenous measure market size they term “potential
demand”. This measure utilizes demographic trends to remove the influence of innovation
on demand (consumers buying more new products because they are valued) in order to
separately identify the influence of demand on innovation (firms developing new products
because they expect them to be valued by consumers). The exogenous expected demand D
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for drug category j at time t is given by

Djt =

X

Iat × Saj

(4.4)

a

where a is a set of 5-year age bins, Iat is the aggregate national income of individuals in age
bin a at time t, and Saj is the average share of group a’s income spent on drug category j.
Acemoglu and Linn (2004) provide evidence that within-group drug expenditure shares are
relatively constant over time while the country’s demographics are not. Intuitively, illnesses
and the medications used to treat them often effect humans at certain ages (e.g. very few
people under 45 take statins, but this share increases dramatically with age), so as the
income of individuals of certain ages grows, so does the demand for drugs that differentially
afflict their age group. Thus, by fixing the expenditure share and only allowing variation
in demographics to cause changes in demand, the measure provides a plausibly exogenous
measure.
Following Acemoglu and Linn (2004), the income component Iat is constructed from the
Current Population Survey (CPS) March supplement and the expenditure component Saj
is constructed from the Prescribed Medicine Files of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
(MEPS). Drug categories are determined based on matching drug names reported in MEPS
to their Anatomic Therapeutic Class (ATC) codes9 outlined in Figure 2. ATC codes are
structured based on a combination of a drug’s mechanisms and the illnesses it is approved
to treat. The MEPS data is only available from 1996 to 2013, therefore we extend the Saj
measure calculated during this timeframe to our full timeframe of 1985 to 2013. CPS data
is available for the full length of our study with all data deflated using the CPI.
4.4.4. NIH Investments in Science
Data on NIH extramural grant awards from 1965 to 2013 was constructed based on data
available from the NIH ExPORTER data files as well as a Freedom of Information Act
9

See http://www.whocc.no/atc_ddd_index/ for more information.
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request for data prior to 2000 that is not readily available in the ExPORTER files10 .
In line with prior research on the allocation of NIH funds (Toole 2012) we employ a keyword
based approach to categorizing grants to each of the 16 ATC classes, and further delineate
whether or not the grant is obviously “applied” research such as clinical trials, as opposed
to basic research aimed at generating new knowledge. By definition, truly “basic” research
has the potential to influence all of our therapeutic categories; however, the NIH requires
that any grant have some potentially relevant public health implication. So when we refer
to “basic” research, we are focusing on research at the NIH that lacks an immediate means
of commercialization. This delineation is possible based on keywords as well as examining
the grant “Activity Code”, which is unique to certain types of grant programs intended to
stimulate more applied research, such as the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and
Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs. This applied research accounted for
roughly 15% of NIH spending annually. However, these investments were never found to
have a significant relationship with either firm R&D or drug approvals, so all results below
are based on the basic science-only measure of NIH investments.
Much like firm investments, we can imagine that NIH investments in research may take time
to influence firm investment decisions or new drug approvals directly. Toole (2012), who used
the same data but only the 8 major categories identified the most statistically significant lagflow construction to be the sum of NIH investments 17 to 24 years prior. Using our sixteen
categories, we identify significant correlations between lagged flows anywhere in timeframe
of 10 to 20 years prior, and based on measures of fit and statistical significance including tstatistics, log-likelihood and Wald chi-square statistic, we identify the flow of NIH spending
15 to 20 years prior as the best predictor of our outcomes of interest. All NIH investments
are deflated using the Biomedical R&D Price Index, which accounts for cost inflation unique
to basic biomedical research.
10

Available at http://exporter.nih.gov. Prior to 2000, the total funding amount for each project is
absent in the ExPORTER files, hence the FOIA request was necessary.
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4.5. Results
4.5.1. Main Findings
Table 15 explores very simple production models where NMEs are the outputs and private
and public investment are the lagged inputs. The models are estimating using data from the
timeframe for which disaggregated private spending is available, 1985-2000. Independently,
and ignoring industry-wide trends, both measures of spending are significantly correlated
with the approval of NMEs. At the sample means of private R&D and NIH spending flows
and assuming a constant marginal effect, the coefficients from columns (1) and (2) of Table
15 suggest an average marginal cost per NME of $273 million and $976 million (in real 2012
dollars) for private R&D and NIH basic science spending, respectively. The private cost per
NME is very close to accounting-based studies, which estimated an average cost between
$200-400 million (DiMasi et al. 1991; DiMasi et al. 2003).
Table 15: NME Production Per Private R&D and NIH Science,
1985-2000
(1)
Private R&D(t−11,t−1)

(2)

0.596***
(0.163)

NIH(t−20,t−15)

0.949***
(0.300)

(3)

(4)

0.223
(0.265)

1.069***
(0.246)

0.828*
(0.476)

(5)

(6)
0.763***
(0.222)

0.812**
(0.395)

0.759
(0.477)

Time(1989−1992)

0.0305
(0.134)

0.114
(0.150)

-0.0258
(0.142)

Time(1993−1996)

-0.171
(0.234)

0.167
(0.214)

-0.256
(0.228)

Time(1997−2000)

-0.514
(0.403)
224

0.0941
(0.320)
224

-0.564
(0.381)
224

N

224

224

224

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the drug-category level.
Fixed effect (drug category) conditional Poisson specifications. Time dummies
are relative to the earliest time period, 1985-1988. All continuous independent
variables are log-transformed.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

This first pass at the cost to the NIH per NME identifies an estimate modestly larger than
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prior work, such as Toole (2012) who identified an average marginal cost of $741 million
using an unconditional (no category fixed effects) Poisson model that treated both private
and NIH spending as exogenous in the same specification. What is perhaps noteworthy
from a policy viewpoint is how large this public investment cost per new drug is relative to
private investment, and how large it makes the total cost of bringing a new drug to market,
with NIH spending swamping the magnitude of private spending over which there has been
so much controversy.
As indicated in Section 2, we assume the two major exogenous inputs to the NME production
function to be the potential for demand driven by demographic trends and investments in
science by the NIH. If these inputs do indeed stimulate private investment in R&D, or
directly result in any NME discoveries (i.e. NIH only), then they should be significantly
correlated with NME approvals. Furthermore, we are interested specifically in whether or
not these correlations changed significantly at all over the past two and a half decades. If
the pharmaceutical industry experienced a significant decline in their productivity during
the cost increases post-2000, then this would manifest in significantly lower NME output
per changes in demand or NIH investments as it implies the industry was no longer able
to convert valuable ideas into new drugs. Figure 4 plots the coefficients of NME counts
regressed on these two inputs and uses interactions with the time dummy variables in order
to present the trends in NME productivity per potential demand and NIH investments. It is
immediately obvious that there is no significant change in the responsiveness of the industry
to opportunities created by changes in either consumer demand or the supply of basic science.
The estimated magnitudes of the elasticity of NME approvals with respect to changes in
potential demand are very similar to the coefficients estimated in Acemoglu and Linn (2004)
initial development of that measure. A number of related studies have investigated the
elasticity of pharmaceutical innovations with respect to changes in demand using a variety
of methods to identify exogenous changes in demand and measures of innovation. Our results
and estimated magnitudes fit squarely in line with this previous work11 .
11

Finkelstein (2004) explores a policy change related to the expected value of certain vaccines and finds
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Figure 18: Trends in NME output per Potential Demand and NIH
Basic Science, 1987-2013

Note: Potential demand is per the exogenous market size measure and NIH
investments are a sum of lagged investments in basic science; both measures
are described in Section 4. Coefficients are plotted from the same conditional
Poisson model of the count of NMEs regressed on drug-class specific demand
and NIH measures interacted with each time dummy variable. Non-interacted
time dummies are also included in the model to capture variation across all
drug classes over time.

The elasticities for NIH investments are at times not significantly different from zero; however, taken altogether the trend indicates a relatively stable relationship that, if anything,
has improved in the past decade. This finding in the aggregate that NIH investments gena 1% increase in expected market size stimulates a 2.5% increase in the number of clinical trials for affected
diseases. Duggan and Morton (2010) and Blume-Kohout and Sood (2013) utilize the enactment of Medicare
Part D as a plausibly exogenous shock to consumers’ willingness to pay for pharmaceuticals and also find
corresponding increases in clinical trials for drug categories expected to grow the largest following Part D’s
enactment. In closely related work, Dubois et al. (2015) utilize detailed global revenue data and instrumental variables approach to estimate this elasticity. Directly comparing their estimates with ours is not
straightforward given the different data sources and measures of demand; however, we can get a sense of
consistency by comparing the estimating change in demand necessary to induce a new NME. At the sample
means, our estimates imply that roughly $1.2 billion is necessary, with Dubois et al. (2015) finding that $2.5
billion is necessary, despite their elasticity estimate being an order of magnitude less than ours (0.25 versus
3.0). We consider these estimates to be relatively consistent given the differences in sample periods and the
fact that we lack data on worldwide revenues.
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erate valuable downstream outcomes has received support from Azoulay et al. (2015c) who
use more fine-grain data and careful econometric techniques.
Table 16: Private R&D Investments per NIH and Potential Demand, 1985-2000
Potential Demandt

(1)
1.556***
(0.221)

NIH(t−20,t−15)

(2)

(3)
1.366***
(0.210)

0.361***
(0.0901)

0.311***
(0.0914)

Time(1989−1992)

0.201***
(0.0230)

0.245***
(0.0347)

0.157***
(0.0351)

Time(1993−1996)

0.454***
(0.0306)

0.563***
(0.0556)

0.360***
(0.0565)

Time(1997−2000)

0.487***
(0.0523)
224
0.883

0.836***
(0.0825)
224
0.881

0.401***
(0.0806)
224
0.899

N
adj. R2

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the drug-category level.
Fixed effect (drug category) OLS specifications.

Time dummies are rela-

tive to the earliest time period, 1985-1988. All continuous variables are logtransformed. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

These results also provide support for the first stage of our model - that changes in these
inputs are the major forces spurring industry investment. To explore this relationship specifically, Table 16 presents the results of estimating equation (2) using OLS with drug-class
fixed effects and time dummies. Because this disaggregated data on private R&D is only
available pre-2001 we can only estimate the equation for this portion of our timeframe.
Within this period, we find evidence that our measures of demand and NIH investments are
both significantly correlated with investments by the pharmaceutical industry.
The magnitudes of the coefficients suggest that for each 10% increase in the potential market
size of a drug-class for a given year, the industry will have invested 14% more into R&D.
Likewise, for each 10% increase in NIH investments in the years prior, the industry will
invest 3% more into R&D. Relatively speaking, it appears that the pharmaceutical industry
is significantly more responsive to changes in demand compared to changes in the supply of
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science. However, as noted earlier, the magnitude of NIH investments relative to the market
sizes is much larger - directly comparing these relative elasticities should be done so with
this in mind.
The time dummies in these models also indicate that aside from our two measures, there also
appears to have been a significant increase in R&D investments over this timeframe with
roughly 40% larger investments observed in the late 1990’s compared to the late 1980’s,
conditional on our inputs and fixed differences across the drug classes. And notably, these
models explain upwards of 90% of the variation in R&D investments within each drug
class, supporting our assumption that these are likely the major drivers of R&D investment
decisions in this industry.
Given the stability and significance of our model of private R&D determinants, we use the
estimates from this first stage in order to project out predicting spending post-2000 under the assumption that the relationships identified in Table 16 column (3) persist. The
result of these linear projections are aggregated to industry total annual investments and
compared to the observed data (see Figure 15). Our model appears to predict R&D investments reasonably well in the post-2000 period where we observe only inputs and not actual
category-specific investments. But notably, our model regularly underpredicts investments
in this period on the order of 20-30%. In a later section, we speculate that this may be due
to entry drawing down above normal economic profits.
Table 17 presents the results from re-estimating the models presented in Table 15 where
private R&D was assumed endogenous and the data was limited to pre-2001. Comparing
the coefficients on our predicted R&D measure to the coefficients on the time dummies allows
us to examine whether any changes in productivity appeared to occur for marginal or average
investments, respectively. Our predicted R&D measure is significantly correlated with NME
output, and per column (3) this relationship did not appear to change significantly during
the so-called crisis of the 2000’s.
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Table 17: NME Production with Endogenous Investments, 1985-2013
(1)
Pred. R&D(t−11,t−1)

(2)

1.796***
(0.549)

NIH Basic(t−20,t−15)

(3)

(4)

1.799***
(0.539)

1.963***
(0.747)

0.459**
(0.223)

Pred. R&D(t−11,t−1)
× 2001-on

-0.0869
(0.331)
-0.0191
(0.232)

Time89−92

-0.0962
(0.164)

0.183
(0.131)

-0.0970
(0.163)

-0.111
(0.162)

Time93−96

-0.237
(0.276)

0.304
(0.189)

-0.239
(0.272)

-0.268
(0.274)

Time97−00

-0.701
(0.479)

0.263
(0.298)

-0.704
(0.473)

-0.768
(0.478)

Time01−04

-1.183**
(0.520)

-0.00462
(0.278)

-0.742
(5.523)

-1.264**
(0.523)

Time05−08

-1.699***
(0.517)

-0.312
(0.268)

-1.255
(5.553)

-1.793***
(0.528)

Time09−13

-1.550***
(0.587)
464
Full

-0.0418
(0.338)
464
Full

-1.105
(5.550)
464
Full

-1.652***
(0.595)
464
Full

N
Period

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the drug-category level.
Fixed effect (drug category) conditional Poisson specifications. Time dummies
are relative to the earliest time period, 1985-1988. All independent continuous
variables are log-transformed. Predicted R&D is the linear projection of private
R&D investments based on the correlations from Table 16, Column (3), without
time-period dummies since they are not identified in the post-2000 timeframe.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Rather, it appears that the significant declines in NME output occurred for the average idea
as the time dummies for NME outputs post-2000 are significantly less than zero. In other
words, the estimates indicate that after 2000, across all therapeutic categories, the average
rate of NME approvals was roughly 150% lower than before.
Certainly we are not the first to identify this decline in approvals conditional on observed
investments. However, the important point and major contribution of this Chapter is that
these results imply the declines were amongst the average drug discovery project and not the
marginal project. As argued in Section 2, this distinction has important policy implications.
Our results do not point to any significant difference in this industries’ ability to turn the
next (marginal) idea into a valuable drug, relative to what was observed in decades prior.
Rather, it appears that the average expected costs of operating in this industry are what
increased.
Referring back to Figure 2, this indicates that the distribution of ideas is relatively linear
and that as forces of supply (NIH science) and demand (demographic trends) increase the
value of the marginal drug idea, firms are willing to incur higher average costs in order
to continue to produce profits. While we cannot directly connect our results to changes
in social welfare, this result implies that, should policymakers seek to increase the rate at
which new drugs are introduced, policies should focus on decreasing the fixed costs common
to all new drug ideas. These costs might include efforts such as establishing clinical trial
networks across the country (or globe), or the ability to access new results from publicly
funded biomedical research.
4.5.2. Explaining the Increase in Investments beyond the NIH and Demand
Recall from Figure 15 that, while our model of R&D was able to relatively accurately predict
the trend in investments, it appears we under-predict investments for the majority of years
post-2000, typically on the order of 20-30%. As argued previously, this “overinvestment”
(relative to the expected response to NIH investments and shifts in demand) stands in
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contrast to a growth supply-side frictions that prior literature has frequently suggested12 .
If firms were truly faced with new problems in their governance, or regulations became
suddenly more burdensome, this should have been met with a slower growth in R&D costs
(relative to pre-2000) as markets grew. In contrast, our regressions indicate that the marginal
idea (as proxied by marginal R&D spending) resulted in the same number of NMEs in
expectation after 2000 compared to before (See Table 16, Column 3). Likewise, Figure 4
indicates a very stable relationship between changes in the demand of new drugs and the
rate of new drug approvals.
Instead we propose two alternatives13 : (1) the growing value of health, and (2) competing
away of supranormal profits. To the first point, while the Acemoglu and Linn (2004) measure
of potential demand is empirically useful in that it identifies plausibly exogenous shifts in
demand, it assumes that the elasticity of health spending with respect to income is fixed at
one. Thus, the value of health to each individual is held constant. Hall and Jones (2007)
present and solve a detailed model of health investment and production which, upon solving
numerically, implies an elasticity significantly greater than 114 . These magnitudes imply
that our measure underestimates changes in demand at times of income growth, hence the
underpredictions of our full model. However, micro-level evidence has yet to provide robust
support for elasticities much greater than one (Acemoglu et al. 2013), and so we are reluctant
to propose this mechanism as being fully responsible for our finding.
Our second proposed mechanism is based on the notion that, in industries such as this, the
enormous barriers to entry will prevent new firms from immediately competing away excess
12

We are agnostic to stable frictions that may exist on the supply-side in this market, such as the “shorttermism” of managers discussed by Budish et al. (2015) or the effect of regulatory requirements at the FDA.
We are only concerned with whether changes in the effects of these frictions might be responsible for the
growth in R&D costs observed.
13
The introduction of Medicare Part D in 2003 should also be noted. The demand measure does not
perfectly capture the portion of growth in potential market size driven by this major policy. In order to
maintain exogeneity, it holds age-category by drug-category expenditure shares (Sjt in eq. 1) fixed based on
the sample average which includes seven years prior to Part D’s introduction. Thus, therapeutic categories
that experience the largest growth in utilization by Part D eligible individuals likely underestimate true
growth in demand post-2003.
14
Depending on their method of solving for the elasticity and the assumptions involved, Hall and Jones’
(2007) point estimates range between 1.5 and 2.
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returns (relative to other industries). The appearance of supranormal profits being a key
feature of this industry prior to 2000 has been highlighted previously, and it was hypothesized
that new entry should eventually bid these returns down to levels seen in other industries
(Scherer 2001; Danzon 2011). In order to explore trends in industry profits, Figure 5 plots
two measures of profitability using PhRMA reported sales and R&D investment data: (1)
annual revenues per “on-patent” NMEs, and (2) annual revenues per prior R&D investments.
The first measure speaks to the value of new drugs. We define “on-patent” NMEs as those
Figure 19: Trends in Revenues per Drugs and R&D Expenditures,
1985-2012

Note: Sales are US-based revenues. On-patent NME refers to New Molecular
Entities approved in the 10 years prior. R&D investments are lagged 10 years
relative to the reported year, and are capitalized using a 10% annual interest
rate. Based on data in PhRMA Annual Reports and FDA new drug approvals.

approved by the FDA in the ten years prior to the focal year, given the average length of
patent protection post FDA approval15 . Prior to 2000, the average revenues per on-patent
NME was relatively stable at roughly $625 million per year per drug. A noticeable increase
in the value of these drugs is obvious, beginning around 2000 and continuing to our most
15

This simplifying definition is useful because connecting individual patents to individual molecules is
not a straightforward exercise as multiple patents may cover a single “drug”, which may also hold different
market exclusivities (either via a patent of FDA policy) for different indications.
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recent data, reaching nearly $1 billion per year per drug.
Conversely, the trend in revenues per R&D investments - a measure indicative of overall
industry profitability - suggests a significant decline in overall returns. Prior to 2000 the
data indicates that each dollar of R&D was generating upwards of six dollars in future
revenues, even after accounting for the capitalization of costs during the long development
times (assumed here to be 10 years on average). Certainly our measure of costs is not
perfectly comprehensive: only “R&D” costs are reported in the PhRMA data. Still, this
magnitude of returns to capital, even under generous assumptions about unmeasured costs16 ,
is objectively large.
But after 2000, the return to R&D has essentially halved while the average returns for each
new drug has increased by roughly 30%. This pattern of lower overall returns even amidst
increasingly valuable (based on revenue per product) products is in line with the notion
competitive pressures decreased profit margins even as the demand for new drugs continued
to grow. A full-fledged analysis of competition in this industry is beyond the scope of this
Chapter, so we only offer some speculations as to why these returns were so excessive in
earlier periods. Many observers have noted the growth in entrepreneurial firms engaging
in biomedical research, which is likely a function of decreasing fixed costs of R&D prior to
clinical trials. Others have argued that the financial arrangements unique to the healthcare
sector have given rise to a “medical innovation premium” (Koijen et al. 2016), which may be
declining over time as the uncertainties surrounding new drug production become resolved
in the long-run.
16

Data on industry-wide non-R&D expenditures is not readily available. Arguably, aside from R&D
the industry’s largest expenditures may be in the form of physician-based payments via detailing or other
interactions. Reports from the Open Payments function of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid services
indicate that in between 2013 and 2015, roughly $3 to $7 billion was paid to physicians in some form (e.g.
meals, travel, education) annually (Source: openpaymentsdata.cms.gov). Relative to approximately $50
billion in annual R&D investments, these additional costs would not substantially alter the magnitude of
returns presented in Figure 5.
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4.6. Conclusion
This Chapter introduces an alternative perspective on the productivity changes observed
in the pharmaceutical industry over the past twenty years. The traditional view has taken
firm R&D investments as given, and speculated about what supply-side frictions have arisen
to cause the declines in productivity - drugs per R&D dollar - observed. In contrast, we
take the amount invested (and expectations of success and profits) as endogenous, and
suggest why firms would pursue less productive investments in a world of fixed resources
(i.e. new drug ideas). We attribute this pursuit in large part to a documented growth in the
demand for new products and fluctuations in NIH spending that increased the returns to the
marginally profitable drug idea. Much like the farmers studied by Ricardo, pharmaceutical
firms appeared willing to take on increased costs given expectations of increased demand productivity declines were a profitable choice, not a worrisome problem.
We motivate our analyses with a simplified production function that accounts for this endogeneity of R&D investments. Although, the data requires that we analyze relatively
aggregate categories of investments across therapeutic classes. In particular, our estimates
imply that the marginal value of new drug ideas has not changed significantly over the past
thirty years, while the average value of these ideas did decline substantially post-2000. These
results suggest that policies intent on stimulating further innovation in this industry may
be most effective when designed to lower the fixed costs of R&D shared by all active R&D
projects, such as establishing clinical trial networks, as opposed to subsidizing marginal
expenditures with tax credits.
Examining trends in revenues and costs more generally, we also speculate that industry-wide
profitability was above normal prior to 2000 - a feature documented previously (Danzon
2011) - so new investment at lower (but still positive) marginal profit was the result of entry
(eventually) bidding down returns. We think this view places less emphasis on the idea that
there is something on the supply side that needs to be “fixed” (by changes in firm strategies,
trial design, or new institutes of health) and more emphasis on a natural economic model
113

of investment where transitions between equilibria, during which profits are supranormal,
takes time. Looking forward, if the demand for new drugs continues to grow, and there is
cause to think it will (a la Hall and Jones 2007), and there is not a major boost to NIH
investments, we expect continued declines in the number of new drugs per R&D dollar, but
do not see this a case for major policy interventions or concern.
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